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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to provide the Air Force, Army, and Navy with 
a benchmark study of lessons learned from the implementation of the Air Force 
Program Executive Office for Combat and Mission Support.  Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Dr. Ashton Carter expressed in 
his June 2010 memorandum, Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency 
and Productivity in Defense Spending, sent to all acquisition professionals, a need to 
improve tradecraft in service acquisition across the DoD.  His memorandum directly 
stated that the Army and Navy should, “following the Air Force’s example,” create a 
senior manager for the acquisition of services.  This benchmark study seeks to use 
the Government Accountability Office Framework for Assessing the Acquisition 
Function at Federal Agencies to provide a list of best practices to all DoD agencies. 
Keywords: Program Executive Office for Combat Mission Support, service 
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I. Introduction 
A. Background  
Service contracting is a complex mix of art and science that relies heavily 
on integration, abstraction, and flexibility to be managed successfully due to its 
complexity and importance.  This point is especially true as the level of services 
contracting grows to exceed the level of supplies contracting in the Department 
of Defense’s (DoD’s) budget portfolio and becomes more integrated into how the 
DoD operates.  As of fiscal year (FY) 2009, DoD service contracts exceeded 
product contracts 57% to 43% in terms of dollar value (Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2011).  The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group (DIIG) calculated that supplies and services each compose 42% 
(84% combined) of the DoD’s outlays each year (CSIS DIIG, 2011).  However, 
CSIS DIIG did state that this ratio relied on numbers from the Air Force that were 
underestimated due to a large proportion of classified spending. Yet, the DoD 
and its agencies have placed relatively minimal focus on the management 
principles and processes that support service acquisitions.   
Policies, memoranda, and reports have been issued within the federal 
government since the late 1990s regarding initiatives to improve service 
contracting within the government and the DoD.  President Barack Obama 
(2009) made the following statement in a March 2009 memorandum addressed 
to the heads of executive departments and agencies:  
It is essential that the Federal Government have the capacity to carry out 
robust and thorough management and oversight of its contracts in order to 
achieve programmatic goals, avoid significant overcharges, and curb 
wasteful spending. A GAO study last year of 95 major defense 
acquisitions projects found cost overruns of 26 percent, totaling $295 
billion over the life of the projects. Improved contract oversight could 
reduce such sums significantly.  Government outsourcing for services also 
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The President appointed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as 
the general point-of-contact for developing guidance for overseeing and 
improving federal contracting.  Among the goals President Obama discussed 
was improvement in the oversight and categorization of services that agencies 
should contract out (Obama, 2009). 
The current USD(AT&L), Dr. Ashton Carter, reemphasized the need to 
adopt government practices that encourage efficiency (USD[AT&L], 2010a).  One 
of the primary practices Dr. Carter identified was the need to manage service 
acquisition oversight and policy at more senior levels for all of the DoD 
(USD[AT&L], 2010a).  Until recently, the Air Force Program Executive Officer for 
Combat and Mission Support (AFPEO/CM) was the only senior executive in the 
DoD’s military departments dedicated to the execution of contract services 
acquisition.  Dr. Carter directed that all military departments adopt a senior-level 
management model similar to the Air Force’s (USD[AT&L], 2010b). 
B. Purpose 
The purpose of our research is to provide the Air Force, the Army, and the 
Navy with a benchmark study of lessons learned from the creation of the 
AFPEO/CM.  Dr. Carter outlined in his September 14, 2010, memorandum to all 
secretaries of the military departments and directors of the defense agencies the 
need to improve tradecraft in service acquisition across the DoD (USD[AT&L], 
2010b).  Carter’s memorandum required the Army and the Navy to create a 
senior manager for the acquisition of services “following the Air Force’s example" 
(USD[AT&L], 2010b, p. 11).  In this benchmark study we seek to use the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2005) Framework for Assessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies (Framework) to provide a list of best 
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C. Research Questions 
No benchmark studies have identified which lessons learned and best 
practices the Army and the Navy should take from the AFPEO/CM.  In this thesis, 
we assess the AFPEO/CM using the questions in the GAO (2005) Framework 
found in the section titled Cornerstone 2, Policies and Processes, and we 
compile a report of best practices and lessons learned in order for both Army and 
Navy senior service acquisition managers to see what roles, structures, and 
management practices have and have not worked well. 
1. Primary Research Question 
 What are the best practices within the AFPEO/CM structure? 
2. Supplementary Research Questions 
 What are the primary lessons learned from working with the 
AFPEO/CM? 
 What recommendations should the Army and the Navy 
incorporate into developing their senior manager position for 
service acquisition? 
D. Benefits & Limitations of the Research 
The DoD Inspector General (DoD IG, 2009) summary audit report 
expressly stated that the DoD should establish cross-functional working groups 
to identify, among other things, “best practices and lessons learned, and 
recommendations to increase accountability and oversight and to decrease 
complexity” (p. 50) in acquisition and contract administration.  Our research 
report outlines the benefit of compiling many best practices and lessons learned 
from current and previous members and customers of the AFPEO/CM into a 
single comprehensive document that can be used by the Army and the Navy or 
by the DoD as a whole.   
Furthermore, the Army and the Navy can glean examples and direct 
suggestions from interviews conducted with the primary developers and 
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to set up a senior manager of service contracts.  The military components may 
also note from this report how the practices and lessons are directly related to 
the GAO (2005) Framework. 
Our report is limited in that we only conducted interviews at the 
AFPEO/CM and Air Force Major Command (MAJCOM) levels.  Individual 
squadrons and contractors themselves were not interviewed as part of this 
research project.  Furthermore, this report is limited from the standpoint that we 
did not interview members of the GAO, the Army, or the Navy in relation to the 
use of a senior executive for services. 
E. Methodology 
To study the AFPEO/CM, we used Cornerstone 2 from the GAO (2005) 
Framework.  The primary function of the Framework is to provide executive 
management with a means to assess the strengths and weaknesses of high-level 
acquisition functions.  Based on Cornerstone 2, we developed a list of interview 
questions (see Appendix A) to ask members in the Air Force acquisition and 
contracting communities.  We interviewed the current acting Program Executive 
Officer for Combat and Mission Support at the AFPEO/CM, Mr. Randall 
Culpepper, as well as some of his predecessors.  In addition, we interviewed four 
individuals in the AFPEO/CM as well as some of the primary customers of the 
AFPEO/CM.  More details on the GAO Framework and the interviews we 
conducted are in Chapter IV, Methodology. 
F. Organization of Report 
This report is comprised of six chapters.  In this chapter, we introduced the 
research background, purpose, and topic, and we briefly introduced the 
methodology we used in conducting our research.  In Chapter II, Literature 
Review, we expressly address a review of services contracting policy within the 
DoD, and within the Air Force specifically.  In Chapter II we also review literature 
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and findings in services contracting as well as the component service 
management approaches.  In Chapter III, AFPEO/CM Organization and Policy, 
we specifically address the organizational structure and official policies that 
manage and govern the AFPEO/CM.  In Chapter IV, Methodology, we explain 
our research interview methods and framework, which we derived specifically 
from the GAO (2005) Framework.  In Chapter V, Findings, Results, and 
Recommendations, we explain our analysis of the responses to the interview 
questions derived from the GAO Framework and our recommendations in the 
areas of best practices and cautions for the DoD component Services.  Finally, in 
Chapter VI, Summary, Conclusions, and Further Research, we summarize our 
findings and overall conclusions and recommend areas for further research 
regarding executive management of services contracting. 
G. Summary 
In this chapter we introduced the background, purpose, research 
questions, benefits, and limitations of the research and included a brief 
discussion of the methodology and the organization of the report.  The next 
chapter contains an in-depth literature review of the GAO and other DoD 
research reports, after which we discuss the nature, trends, and findings in 
services contracting as well as the service acquisition management approaches 
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II. Literature Review 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, we review literature regarding the nature of service 
contracts.  First, we review applicable GAO reports and the findings and 
recommendations of the recent Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Improvements to Services Contracting. Next, we cover the services acquisition 
management approaches of the DoD component Services (Army, Navy, and Air 
Force).  Finally, we examine the specific federal, DoD, and Air Force policies 
regarding the management and oversight of services acquisitions.  
B. Nature of Services Contracts 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2005) defines a service contract 
as a “contract that directly engages the time and effort of a contractor whose 
primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end 
item of supply” (subpart 37.101).  To understand how to manage, direct, and 
improve services contracting, personnel have to grasp the overall nature of 
services contracting as opposed to contracting for supplies.  This consideration is 
important to acquisition professionals seeking to improve services contracting 
because they typically have been trained in an environment of contracting that 
focuses primarily on the laws, standards, processes, and management practices 
of supply contracts (USD[AT&L], 2011).  
A body of literature has accumulated involving the nature of services 
contracts.  This literature leans heavily on the research and writing involving 
operations management in service companies.  Research conducted by Apte, 
Apte, and Rendon (2009a, 2009b, 2010); Apte, Ferrer, Lewis, and Rendon 
(2006); and Apte and Rendon (2007) at the Naval Postgraduate School identified 
three primary characteristics in the nature of services contracts that have been 
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that services contracts are (1) complex, (2) diverse, and (3) intangible (Apte, 
Ferrer, et al., 2006).   
Services are complex in the sense that they involve the ideas of 
coproduction and multi-stage processes.  Coproduction means that the services 
contracts are a product of development as well as of performance that involves 
the customer’s subjective input throughout the service contract’s life cycle (Apte, 
Ferrer, et al., 2006).  In other words, this complexity can make satisfactory 
performance hard to define and measure.  Services also evolve over multiple 
stages of performance and development, both with the contractor’s operations 
and the customer’s mission needs (Apte, Ferrer, et al., 2006).  This evolution, 
paired with the complexity, make writing an initial services contract that accounts 
for every possible scenario hard to accomplish.  It also makes development of a 
life cycle for services harder to define because it is not as step-by-step and 
sequential as a product development life cycle (Apte & Rendon, 2007; 
USD[AT&L], 2011). 
Services are also diverse.  Diversity drives the aforementioned “art” in 
services contracting.  Comprehensive standards for contract methods and 
management are hard to define and vary across a wide variety of services (Apte, 
Ferrer, et al., 2006).  Whereas methods for buying products are relatively simliar 
at the foundational level, methods for services contracting can vary for the same 
service from location to location and especially between military departments 
(e.g., performance-based acquisitions versus standard level of service).  This 
diversity makes it harder to initially define requirements and makes it difficult for 
the DoD to aggregate service contract knowledge management due to varying 
procurement categorizations (USD[AT&L], 2011). 
Finally, services are highly intangible.  This degree of intangibility makes 
defining the initial requirements difficult and quantifying the quality assurance 
measurements hard.  This characteristic, as well as the others mentioned, does 
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intangibility of services definitions and quality creates an environment wherein 
the customer’s experience subjectively becomes a part of the service quality that 
is measured (Apte, Ferrer, et al., 2006).   With supply contracts, all measures are 
quantitative from product development to delivery time.  Services have schedules 
and deliverables that vary based on customer interaction and experience.  To 
better manage service contracts, Apte, Ferrer, et al. (2006) introduced the 
concept of a service contract life cycle in their research. 
DoD services acquisition has been found lacking in the area of formal 
program management.  Services program management in the DoD is not as 
developed as major weapons systems program management (Apte & Rendon, 
2007).  Furthermore, service acquisitions do not have dedicated program 
managers to oversee and manage the acquisition life cycle.  Fundamentally more 
important, the service acquisition life cycle does not actually exist in a fully 
defined fashion (Apte & Rendon, 2007).   
The three primary elements of any project are cost, schedule, and 
performance.  However, services acquisitions lack the concepts of project life 
cycle, empowered cross-functional teams, dedicated program managers, and 
adequate organizational structures that are necessary to monitor and control the 
three primary elements.  Processes and cross-functional teams for services 
acquisitions in the DoD are not integrated into or coordinated with a firm project 
goal, as they are with weapons systems.  Looking at organizational structure, the 
DoD is not set up to facilitate the appropriate level of effort to manage services 
acquisitions with clear roles and responsibilities for each program.  Typically, 
service acquisitions are managed at the installation level with the contracting 
officer (CO) acting as the de facto program manager (PM).  This happens 
because there are no other PMs at the base and because the contracting 
process is the only formalized acquisition process in use among the acquisition’s 
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This complexity, diversity, and intangibility drive the need for specific and 
separately defined policies and procedures, roles and responsibilities, and skills 
to better manage, oversee, and realize potential benefits from services contracts.  
The DoD has shown that it has weaknesses in these areas and requires 
improvement.  The GAO has noted these deficiencies as well. 
C. GAO Service Contract Reviews 
DoD contract management has been on the GAO’s high-risk list since 
1992.  In reviewing the acquisition of services, the GAO has found that the DoD 
exposes itself to “unnecessary risks” by being inefficient and ineffective (GAO, 
2007, p. 5).  The main problems the GAO noted were the DoD’s propensity for 
poorly defined service requirements and objectives, inadequate competition, 
inadequate monitoring and oversight of services, and inappropriate use of 
services under contract.  The GAO found that the DoD has managed service 
acquisitions reactively to the point that service contracts just “tend to happen ... 
rather than being proactively managed” (GAO, 2007, p. 12).  Furthermore, the 
GAO recommended that the DoD take a more strategic approach to service 
contracting (GAO, 2007). 
The DoD increasingly relies on service contractors for mission-essential 
services conducted within the DoD.  The DoD has decreased its civilian 
workforce in the areas of cost estimating, weapons maintenance, intelligence, 
space launch services, and security, among other fields, while also decreasing its 
contract management workforce (GAO, 2007).  As a result, the DoD is acquiring 
more services via contract with fewer contract managers to effectively control 
and monitor them (GAO, 2007).   
The GAO also found that the DoD does not use sound business practices 
in acquiring services (GAO, 2007).  In particular, poorly defined requirements, 
poor management, and poor oversight have led to late deliveries and missed 
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with contractors upfront to better transform mission objectives into contract terms 
and conditions, which when adequate, would allow the DoD to better measure 
contractor performance and hold contractors accountable to the terms of the 
contract (GAO, 2007). 
The GAO also found that the DoD does not allow for adequate competition 
for many of its service contracts (GAO, 2007).  This finding was based on a study 
of service contracts awarded on a sole-source basis for services that were 
previously competed, which led to a higher price.   The study also found that the 
DoD did not properly justify the use of sole-source acquisitions in accordance 
with FAR part 6 (GAO, 2007). 
The GAO also noted deficiencies in how the DoD uses interagency 
service contracts.  Because these contracts are not centrally managed or 
monitored, they become high-risk contracts that grow rapidly, causing customers 
to have limited expertise and training on how to use and administer them (GAO, 
2007).  In addition, accountability for these interagency contracts is hard, if not 
impossible, to define.  The DoD itself does not have useful information for the 
acquiring agency on the costs versus benefits of using these interagency service 
contracts (GAO, 2007). 
In terms of surveillance or “quality assurance,” DoD service contracts have 
not been managed well.  Findings show that surveillance personnel are ill trained 
and are not conducting and properly documenting their surveillance (GAO, 
2007).  Furthermore, the DoD does not hold surveillance personnel accountable 
for these deficiencies in service contract oversight.  The GAO attributes this lack 
of surveillance to poor program management and ill-defined requirements by 
both the DoD and the contractor (GAO, 2007). 
Most important, the GAO found that DoD service acquisitions need more 
management and oversight at the strategic levels (GAO, 2007).  The GAO found 
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11) with responsibilities too spread out across the department.  This 
fragmentation has led to the DoD having very little visibility or control over service 
acquisition programs.  Finally, the GAO found that the DoD is deficient in service 
direction and vision in terms of what it needs, its ability to capture information for 
making informed decisions, its methods to achieve department-wide goals and 
objectives, and its poor system of assessing the resources that the department 
has on hand to meet its service needs (GAO, 2007). 
At the transaction level, the GAO found that the DoD needs to create more 
valid, defined requirements using appropriate business arrangements and that it 
needs to institute adequate management methods for contractor quality and 
performance (GAO, 2007).  The GAO encouraged the DoD to implement a 
structure that more centrally and strategically manages service programs (GAO, 
2007).  
The GAO provided the DoD with best practices from industry in the past 
(General Accounting Office [GAO], 2002).  The GAO (2002) looked at Fortune 
500 companies that had successfully implemented service acquisition 
management practices that improved company performance.  These companies 
found that they needed to take a more strategic enterprise approach to acquiring 
services by increasing the quality of information tools they used to aggregate and 
analyze the spend data for service acquisitions and then by spreading that 
information across all stakeholders in the organization (GAO, 2002).  Some of 
the key elements that the GAO found in leading companies were high-level 
leadership committing to a strategic approach to service acquisition and high-
level leadership creating supporting structures, processes, and roles to 
implement these strategies (GAO, 2002).  Additional key elements were 
obtaining improved knowledge management systems to aggregate and analyze 
service spending and enabling the success of those processes through 
“leadership, communication, and metrics” (GAO, 2002, p. 15).  Additionally, 
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opportunities, improving cost–cutting, and enhancing supplier management 
(GAO, 2002).   
The companies studied by the GAO (2002) also increased the role of the 
procurement function and utilized cross-functional teams to aid in requirements 
development, vendor selection, and quality assurance management (GAO, 
2002).  The GAO identified increasing the role of the procurement function as a 
key element to managing the federal agencies’ acquisition process effectively 
(GAO, 2005). 
The GAO (2002) summarized that the highest risks to DoD service 
acquisitions were poor acquisition planning, poor competition, and poor service 
contract management.  The report detailed six industry-leading companies who 
implemented four main principles that helped them successfully implement a 
strategic approach to service acquisition (GAO, 2002).  The four principles listed 
were commitment, knowledge, change, and support (GAO, 2002).  Commitment 
from top leaders involves recognizing and communicating the need to change 
service acquisition and providing clear goals through executive leadership (GAO, 
2002).  Knowledge involves developing better information systems and analyzing 
the data to identify possible areas for cost reductions and opportunities for 
improved quality and management of the service.  Change includes creating or 
identifying a central service management organization, utilizing proactive 
stakeholder management, and using cross-functional teams that involve service 
experts (GAO, 2002).  Support involves enlisting and maintaining support from 
senior leadership, establishing clear communication channels, and using metrics 
to show credibility and value in the new service acquisition management 
processes (GAO, 2002). 
The GAO found that the DoD has weaknesses in terms of its lack of a 
single automated system for contract information management, its financial 
management system could not produce accurate information for timely decisions, 
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Furthermore, the GAO asked the DoD to assess its financial management 
systems, organizational structures, processes, roles, and support for the strategic 
purchasing of services (GAO, 2002).  The GAO also found that the DoD can be 
more effective in managing and acquiring services by providing sound and 
committed leadership, developing and using data (knowledge), ensuring that 
processes create results, and tracking these results with good metrics (GAO, 
2002).  Creating centralized service management organizations also helps 
ensure that service contract data, service processes, and teams are managed 
more efficiently and consistently across the organization.   
These weaknesses are noted consistently across the body of literature 
that we have reviewed regarding services contracting.  The Defense Science 
Board commissioned a task force that provided recommendations on what the 
DoD should focus on to improve services contracting.  These recommendations 
have a further list of “actions” that the task force suggested the DoD undertake.  
These recommendations and actions closely parallel the GAO’s Framework that 
we use in this study as a methodology, which we discuss in further detail in 
Chapter IV of this report.  It is noteworthy to mention that each military 
department should implement these recommendations at varying degrees, as 
shown in research conducted by Apte, Apte, and Rendon (2010). 
D. Task Force Recommendations to the DoD 
Many of the challenges faced in services contracting have been somewhat 
self-imposed by the DoD and the federal government.  After passing the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, the government expected to be 
significantly more efficient in conducting acquisitions and in reducing the federal 
acquisition workforce by nearly half from 1994 to 2001 (GAO, 2001a).  However, 
during this period, the contracting workload increased by 12%, which caused 
many of the inefficiencies and ineffective work practices noted by the GAO in 
later reports.  The dramatic drop in acquisition personnel coupled with the 
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as workforce training, requirements definition, and contractor surveillance (GAO, 
2001a, 2001b).  As Figure 1 shows, the year FASA was implemented the DoD 
alone saw its largest single increase in top-line contract spending from fiscal year 
to year (CSIS DIIG, 2011). 
 
Figure 1. Top-Line DoD Contract Spending, 1990–2010 
(CSIS DIIG, 2011) 
In March 2011, the Defense Science Board commissioned a task force to 
report on improvements to services contracting in the DoD (USD[AT&L], 2011).  
The task force noted six key findings in their report: (1) service contracts account 
for more than 50% of the DoD acquisition budget, (2) buying services is 
fundamentally different than buying weapons systems, (3) the DoD workforce is 
not prepared to manage and execute service contracts well, (4) the taxonomy or 
categorization of services is vague and utilizes a one-size-fits- all approach that 
is ineffective in defining services, (5) more detailed guidance is needed to define 
inherently governmental services, and (6) contingency contracting for services is 
a special case that requires separate consideration from peacetime services 
contracting (USD[AT&L], 2011).  The task force offered four recommendations to 
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contracting to address tracking, management, contract structure, and integration 
of commercial practices in services contracting; (2) designate roles and 
responsibilities for senior-level leadership and management of services 
contracting; (3) shift the acquisition training focus from products only to a blend of 
products and services contracting; (4) create separate policies and processes for 
contingency services contracting (USD[AT&L], 2011).  In this report, we focus on 
the first three recommendations.  Because our report focuses on the policies and 
procedures of the senior executive for services contracting at the AFPEO/CM, we 
exclude discussion of the task force’s recommendation for changes to 
contingency services contracting procedures. 
The task force provided the DoD with four recommendations and multiple 
actions in its March 2011 report to the USD(AT&L).  The task force 
recommended that the DoD create new, simplified processes for a spectrum of 
services as opposed to just services in general.  This recommendation included 
establishing a more meaningful taxonomy to categorize the services in the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), carefully developing and monitoring 
the performance measures in each category, better indentifying inherently 
governmental functions, creating more meaningful incentives to motivate 
contractors to perform, increasing positive communication between the 
government and industry, and providing clear guidance on contract types for 
each respective service category (USD[AT&L], 2011).   
More applicable to our research is the task force’s recommendation that 
the DoD designate roles and responsibilities for service contracting leadership.  
This recommendation included training all general officers on services contracts, 
creating a senior-level DoD services focal point position, and creating a services 
acquisition executive in each of the military departments that will establish 
portfolio-specific strategic sourcing offices and category councils (USD[AT&L], 
2011).  This planned realignment is very similar to what the Air Force has done 
with its PEO for Services (AFPEO/CM) and its Enterprise Sourcing Group.  The 
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the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Services and the 
position of Navy Director for Services Acquisition, respectively.   
The other task force recommendation applicable to this research was for 
the DoD to increase the skills of its services acquisition personnel by establishing 
a formal certification requirement for non-contracting services acquisition 
personnel (USD[AT&L], 2011).  Some suggestions from the Defense Science 
Board to increase the skills of personnel were to spread service acquisition 
training across professional military education, to reallocate training dollars from 
product acquisition education to services education, to recruit services experts 
from the commercial sector, and to ensure equitable promotion opportunities for 
military and civilians that focus on services acquisitions (USD[AT&L], 2011).  The 
intent of this recommendation is to enhance knowledge, training, and careers 
through education and a focus on services contracting to ensure that the DoD’s 
best human capital is matched to the resources that expend the bulk of the 
DoD’s budget.  For many years, the GAO has recommended improving human 
capital through education and training to enhance contract management (GAO, 
2001b).  The DoD IG has also audited the DoD’s use of acquisition and contract 
administration in services contracting (DoD IG, 2009). 
E. Inspector General Audits of Acquisition and Contract 
Administration 
The DoD IG’s office issued a summary of its recent acquisition and 
contract audits in April 2009.  This summary report reviewed and grouped 
deficiencies from 142 different DoD IG reports from FY2003 through FY2008.  
Based on the reviews, the DoD IG compiled a list of 12 “issue areas.”  Two of 
these 12 issues were services focused (DoD IG, 2009).   
First, the DoD IG summary report highlighted the inappropriate use of 
performance-based service acquisitions (PBSA) contracts.  Thirteen of the 142 
reports reviewed showed signs of an inappropriate use of PBSAs.  The first 
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received.  Next, the DoD IG cited Robins Air Logistics Center for using an outside 
contractor as opposed to the Marine Corps’ existing infrastructure for vehicle 
overhauls.  Finally, the DoD IG cited the DoD as a whole for using improper 
procedures when awarding and administering contracts for advisory and 
assistance service (A&AS) contracts (DoD IG, 2009). 
Second, the DoD IG summary report highlighted the lack of oversight and 
surveillance by the military departments in services contracting.  Fifty-five of the 
142 reports showed a lack of oversight and inadequate surveillance plans for 
DoD contracts.  Some of the issues noted included the Air Force Research 
Laboratory’s use of generic documents and policy for surveillance that was 
limited to contractor-provided reports on project, technical, and fund status.  
Furthermore, the report cited the Army Intelligence and Information Center for 
awarding a time-and-materials contract without a surveillance plan or 
performance metrics.  Finally, the report noted the use of high-risk cost-
reimbursement contracts for test and range facilities when the government did 
not have sufficient means to monitor contractor performance (DoD IG, 2009). 
The report provided an appendix outlining 21 initial actions for 
implementation in 2008 and 25 actions to implement in 2009 (DoD IG, 2009).  In 
both initial action lists, the DoD IG expressed a need to review and develop a 
certification process and a standard for contracting officer representatives 
(CORs) and mandatory COR appointments prior to contract award in the area of 
sufficient contract surveillance.  First, the report stated the need to “establish a 
Component cross-functional working group to identify and report on source 
selection deficiencies, best practices and lessons learned and recommendations 
to increase accountability and oversight and to decrease complexity” (DoD IG, 
2009, p. 50).  Next, the report expressed the requirement to “assess 
effectiveness of Departmental guidance and training for executing performance-
based acquisition and perform gap analysis in conjunction with the Defense 
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The DoD IG summary report did not provide recommendations to remedy 
these issues, stating that such recommendations were covered in the actual 
individual DoD IG reports, but the report stated that “each acquisition dollar that 
is not prudently spent results in the unavailability of that dollar to fund the top 
priorities of the Secretary of Defense and waste of valuable taxpayer money” 
(DoD IG, 2009, p. 22).  Finally, the report emphasized the need for “management 
oversight, control and enforcement of contracting policies and procedures … to 
ensure that DoD is properly awarding and administering contracts, acquiring 
goods and services, and using funds correctly” (DoD IG, 2009, p. 22). 
F. Army, Navy, & Air Force Service Acquisition 
Management Approaches 
As previously mentioned, each military department within the DoD has its 
own nuances that address and direct how it manages the acquisition of services.  
Each military department takes a different approach to addressing the 
complexity, diversity, and intangibility of services contracting.  These varying 
approaches include different types of organizational structures, acquisition 
regionalization, program management, and communication styles.  Apte, Apte, 
and Rendon (2010) accumulated and documented years of research in their 
report that asked members from each component of the acquisition community to 
answer questions about acquisition management methods, acquisition 
leadership, requirements ownership, and life cycle approach, among other topics.  
The results of their report coupled with data derived from the CSIS DIIG (2011) 
trend analysis show how the components spend and manage services 
expenditures. 
Figure 2 shows that the Army spends the largest share of service contract 
dollars within the DoD, spending $74 billion in FY2010, compared with the Navy’s 
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Figure 2. DoD Contract Spending on Services by Component, 1990–2010 
(CSIS DIIG, 2011) 
This large dollar volume lends itself most to efficiencies and savings from 
strategic management and oversight.  However, as Figure 3 shows, the majority 
of the Army’s services spending occurs at the installation level, not at the 
regional level.  Over half of the time, the Army and the Air Force use a project-
team approach, which is more often than the Navy’s use of a project-team 
approach.  Figure 4 shows that the CO, rather than a program manager, typically 
manages these project-teams, even though requirements ownership is 
predominantly outside of the CO’s area of responsibility, as Figure 5 shows.  
Finally, the Army did not use the concept of a project life cycle during acquisitions 
of both routine and non-routine services as frequently as the Navy and Air Force 
(see Figure 6).  This lack of a project life cycle raises concerns because it 
creates a higher degree of cost, schedule, and performance risk in the military 
department that handles the majority of the DoD’s services spending (Apte, Apte, 
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Figure 3. Acquisition Management Methods 
(Apte, Apte, et al., 2010) 
 
Figure 4. Acquisition Leadership 
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Figure 5. Requirements Ownership 
(Apte, Apte, et al., 2010) 
 
Figure 6. Life Cycle Approach 
(Apte, Apte, et al., 2010) 
The Navy is the second largest spender of the DoD’s services contract 
dollars (see Figure 2).  The Navy operates very differently than the Army or Air 
Force in terms of acquisition management methods (see Figure 3).  The Navy 
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uses project teams 50% of the time.  When the Navy does use project teams, it 
tends to use COs as project managers less often than does the Army or Air 
Force (see Figure 4).  The Navy’s use of non-CO project managers may lend 
itself to better management of those non-routine services for which the Navy 
uses more of a life cycle approach than either the Army or the Air Force (see 
Figure 6; Apte, Apte, et al., 2010). 
Of all the military branches, the Air Force spends the least amount on 
services (but also spends a larger percentage at the installation level versus the 
regional level) relative to the other components of the DoD (see Figures 2 and 3).  
The Air Force utilizes the project-team approach more frequently than the Army 
or the Navy (see Figure 3), but it leans heavily on COs to manage these teams 
(see Figure 4) despite the requirements being outside the CO’s area of 
responsibility (see Figure 5).  The Air Force responses indicate that they use a 
life cycle approach more for routine services than for non-routine services (Apte, 
Apte, et al., 2010).  Apte, Apte, et al. (2010) identified this lack of a life cycle 
approach as being an area for concern because non-routine services have more 
risk than routine services and agencies could benefit more from a life cycle 
approach.  The Air Force utilizes the life cycle approach for routine services more 
than either the Army or Navy but less than the Navy for non-routine services 
(Apte, Apte, et al., 2010).   
G. Services Acquisition Management Policies 
Services acquisitions are governed by laws and policies from multiple 
levels for agencies within the DoD.  At the top are federal laws passed by 
Congress and signed by the President as well as policies from the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) under the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).  The DoD issues acquisition guidance through policies, and the 
Air Force issues guidance through policies and Air Force Instructions (AFIs).  
This section reviews all of the services acquisition guidance that applies to the 
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1. Federal Law and Policies 
Prior to Congress passing the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), federal law did not require robust agency or legislative oversight of 
service contracts.  Section 801 of the 2002 NDAA established section 2330 in 
title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, entitled Procurement of Services: 
Management Structure.  This newly developed section required the Secretary of 
Defense to “establish and implement a management structure for the 
procurement of services for the Department of Defense” (NDAA, 2002, § 
2330(a)).  As part of establishing the management structure, the act required an 
official in each department to be responsible for managing service contracts and 
for managing dollar thresholds for reviews and approvals of service acquisitions 
(with delegations authorized; NDAA, 2002). 
The 2006 National Defense Authorization Act made significant updates to 
the oversight requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2330.  The primary change gave the 
USD(AT&L) explicit responsibility for the oversight of the service contracts for the 
DoD (NDAA, 2006).  The new act also required that each department acquisition 
executive delegate or assume responsibility for that department’s respective 
service contracts (NDAA, 2006).  Similar to the establishment of section 2330 in 
the 2002 NDAA, the 2006 NDAA required the USD(AT&L) to establish review 
thresholds and, for the first time, referred to the thresholds as “services 
acquisitions categories” (NDAA, 2010). 
The most recent change to 10 U.S.C. 2330 occurred in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.  The revised act required the 
USD(AT&L) to oversee an independent review of DoD service acquisitions 
(NDAA, 2010).  As part of the review, the USD(AT&L) had to determine how well 
different departments were using best practices for service contract requirements 
development (NDAA, 2010).  Additionally, the USD(AT&L) had to assess how 
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10 U.S.C. 2330 and whether they had achieved the savings goals required in the 
2002 NDAA (NDAA, 2006). 
In addition to the U.S. Code that governs service contracting, part 37 of 
the FAR (2005) and part 237 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS, 1998) provide the primary day-to-day policy and guidance 
for the acquisition of services in the DoD.  Whereas most of FAR part 37 governs 
services acquisitions generally, FAR subpart 37.5 addresses the management 
and oversight of service contracts for all federal agencies; however, the 
responsibilities for agency heads in this subpart are limited to clearly defining 
requirements, awarding and administering contracts, ensuring that inherently 
governmental services are not contracted, and training staff (FAR, 2005).   The 
only other responsibilities in subpart 37.5 are for other contracting officials to use 
best practices when purchasing and administering service contracts (FAR, 2005).  
Subpart 237.5 of the DFARS only mandates that the agency head must certify 
that new service contract requirements are not personal services (DFARS, 
1998). 
Finally, the OFPP issued a policy letter, Management Oversight of Service 
Contracting, in May 1994.  This policy letter requires all federal executive 
agencies to utilize best practices while managing and administering service 
contracts (OFPP, 1994).  In addition, the letter requires that “sufficiently” trained 
individuals be available to manage service contracts and that the agencies use 
“effective management practices” to implement the policy (OFPP, 1994).  The 
policy does not define the level of training required for sufficiency or the 
management practices required to be effective.  Furthermore, the policy does not 
require more specific oversight than the U.S. Code or the FAR. 
2. Defense Instructions and Policies  
To implement section 801 of the 2002 NDAA, the USD(AT&L) issued an 
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by military departments and other defense agencies (USD[AT&L], 2002).  The 
memorandum’s intention was to “move DoD to a more strategic and integrated 
approach to the acquisition of services” (USD[AT&L], 2002, para. 2).  To meet 
that goal, the USD(AT&L) required each department to develop and recommend 
a services contract oversight process to manage and oversee services 
acquisitions (USD[AT&L], 2002).  The policy also set forth a review and approval 
process for service acquisitions that exceed $500 million, with the USD(AT&L) 
responsible for service acquisitions that exceed $2 billion, and with all of the 
acquisition reviews and approvals delegable (USD[AT&L], 2002).  Additional 
policies in the memorandum require department decision authorities to minimize 
additional directives affecting service acquisitions and the use of an enterprise-
wide approach to acquiring services to maximize the DoD’s cost savings 
(USD[AT&L], 2002). 
After the 2006 NDAA changes to 10 U.S.C. 2330, the USD(AT&L) issued 
an update to the 2002 memorandum with a new title: Acquisition of Services 
Policy (USD[AT&L], 2006c).  The primary focus of this memorandum, closely 
following the change in the law, was a breakdown of the responsibilities of the 
service acquisition executives (SAEs) in the acquisition of services for each 
department and the setting of the Acquisition of Services Categories, a table 
similar to Figure 7 (USD[AT&L], 2006c).  The USD(AT&L) made further changes 
to the DoD acquisitions of services policy in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 
(USD[AT&L], 2008). 
In addition to the FAR and DFARS, services acquisition policy resides in 
DoDI 5000.02 enclosure 9, Acquisition of Services (USD[AT&L], 2008).  
Enclosure 9 applies to all service contracts except research and development or 
other services in support of a separately approved acquisition program 
(USD[AT&L], 2008).  Similar to the FAR and DFARS, enclosure 9 mandates 
responsibilities for the SAE, which include the SAE’s overall responsibility for 
services acquisitions and the fact that the SAE may appoint decision authorities 
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to these responsibilities, enclosure 9 has the most recent Acquisition of Services 
Category thresholds required by the 2006 amendment to 10 U.S.C. 2330 (see 
Figure 7) that outline reviews mandatory for all DoD agencies. 
 
Figure 7. DoD Acquisition of Services Categories 
(USD[AT&L], 2006a) 
The USD(AT&L) has additional policies affecting services acquisitions 
aside from DoDI 5000.02, the Acquisition of Services Categories table, and the 
various memorandums discussed in the previous paragraphs.  In February 2006, 
the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) issued an 
updated policy memorandum mandating the use of PBSA when acquiring 
services (DPAP, 2006).  Also in February 2006, the USD(AT&L) issued an 
update memorandum to address contract management, which the GAO labeled 
as high risk (USD[AT&L], 2006a).  This memorandum detailed a plan that 
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practice approaches required by the 2006 NDAA (USD[AT&L], 2006a).  Another 
policy memorandum from the USD(AT&L) affecting services stated that 
“oversight duties shall not be accrued at the top” (USD[AT&L], 2006b).   
In a 2007 policy letter, the USD(AT&L) delegated review and approval 
procedures for service contracts to the director, DPAP (USD[AT&L], 2007).  To 
ensure compliance with policy, improve quality, and ease best practice 
distribution, the director of DPAP established a peer-review policy in a 2008 
memorandum (DPAP, 2008).  The peer reviews are advisory assessments of 
every acquisition over $1 billion by senior contracting leaders from across the 
DoD (specifically, from outside the procuring agency; DPAP, 2008).  The policy 
requires pre-award peer reviews on all contracts over $1 billion and post-award 
peer reviews on all service contracts that exceed $1 billion (DPAP, 2008).  The 
post-award reviews take place before the exercise of the first option (if 
applicable) and before every subsequent option period (DPAP, 2008).  The 
review assesses how the contractor is performing and how well the government 
is monitoring the contractor’s performance (see Appendix B; DPAP, 2008).  
Additionally, in February 2009, the director of DPAP issued a policy outlining 
“tenets” that were expected to be used when reviewing service acquisitions that 
fall under the DPAP approval authority (Appendix C).  In addition to outlining 
DPAP review areas, the memorandum also required department-level reviewers 
to use the tenets and any other best practices while reviewing service 
acquisitions (DPAP, 2009).   
Finally, in 2010, the USD(AT&L) issued a series of three memorandums 
about better buying power to address the push by President Obama and 
Secretary Gates for spending efficiencies and cost savings.  The first 
memorandum, issued in June 2010, laid out a preliminary plan for cost savings 
and the rationale behind the changes (USD[AT&L], 2010a).  The most important 
reform, for the purposes of this project, was that each military department must 
establish a senior manager for services acquisition, modeled after the 
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substantial detail about the better buying initiatives (USD[AT&L], 2010b).  The 
services acquisition section of this September 2010 policy included directions for 
the establishment of the position of senior manager for services in each 
department, standardization of the classification of services, improved 
requirements definition, improved competition, limited the use of award fee and 
time & materials contracts, and increased small business participation 
(USD[AT&L], 2010b).  The USD(AT&L) issued the final better buying policy in 
November 2010 to implement the guidance covered in the September 2010 
policy (USD[AT&L], 2010c).  Mirroring the September memorandum, the final 
better buying memorandum has a section titled, Improve Tradecraft in Services 
Acquisition, which contains an implementation plan that has specific dates by 
which each department must achieve the initiatives. 
3. Air Force Instructions and Policies 
As with the other military departments, the U.S. Code, FAR, DFARS, and 
the DoD policy letters govern acquisitions for the Air Force.  In addition, the Air 
Force has the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS), 
which contains specific guidance for Air Force procurements.  Part 5337 governs 
services acquisitions, but subpart 5337.5, which governs management and 
oversight of service contracts, directs readers to Chapter 4 of AFI 63-101, 
Acquisition of Services, for agency head responsibilities and oversight guidance 
(AFFARS, 2002).   
Similar to the DoD policies governing services, Chapter 4 of AFI 63-101 
(USAF, 2009), which applies to all services acquired that are not part of weapon 
system development, requires service acquisition managers to take a strategic 
approach to service contract acquisition.  Additionally, Chapter 4 of AFI 63-101 
mandates the review processes required for service acquisition approvals 
(AFPEO/CM, 2009).  The Air Force has developed separate service acquisition 
categories (see Figure 8), which are outlined in Chapter 4 of AFI 63-101 that 
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the AFPEO/CM responsibilities (paragraph 4.4.3), which include the oversight of 
service contracts over $100 million and the determination of key service 
categories for the entire Air Force (AFPEO/CM, 2009). 
In response to Congress’ establishment of 10 U.S.C. 2330 and the DoD’s 
Acquisition of Services policy from 2002, the Air Force developed the USAF 
Management and Oversight of Acquisition of Services Process (MOASP) policy 
(USAF, 2011).  The MOASP detailed the DoD-mandated review thresholds as 
well as pre- and post-contract award management for all Air Force service 
acquisitions (Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition [ASAF(A)], 
2003).  After the DoD approved the MOASP for use across the Air Force in 
February 2003 (USD[AT&L], 2003), the ASAF(A) issued policy delegating the 
management and oversight of services over $100 million to the newly established 
Air Force Program Executive Officer for Services (which the Air Force later 
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Figure 8. Service Acquisition Policy for USAF 
(AFPEO/CM, 2009) 
Additional policies affecting service acquisition in the Air Force include a 
requirement for the Air Force SAE to approve any service requirement (pre-
acquisition) greater than $100 million and for Major Command (MAJCOM) 
commanders to approve service requirements over $10 million (Secretary of the 
Air Force [SECAF], 2006).  The purpose of the review is to reduce service 
contract spending and realize savings through potential strategic sourcing 
(SECAF, 2006).  Finally, the ASAF(A) issued a certification memorandum to the 
director of DPAP after the DPAP Acquisition of Services Policy memorandum in 
2006.  In the memorandum, the ASAF(A) certified that the MOASP is the Air 
Force’s management and oversight for service contracts (ASAF[A], n.d.).  
Furthermore, the memorandum set forth a plan to review current services policy 
and make updates to AFI 63-101, which the Air Force did by incorporating 
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H. Summary 
After reviewing the trends in spending as well as in services acquisition 
management, it is apparent that each of the military departments is operating 
with methods independent of the other departments and that each could benefit 
from practices employed by the others.  For instance, the Air Force and the Army 
could realize cost and management efficiencies by taking the Navy’s more 
regional approach, whereas the Navy, as a regionalized model, needs to 
incorporate more of a project management approach by using project teams.  
The concepts of communication, cross-functional teams, and life cycle 
management are all indicative of more strategic corporate management 
structures, policies, and procedures than acquisition management of the past.  
Independent oversight from the GAO and the DoD IG and management direction 
from the President down to the USD(AT&L) indicates that the management of 
services acquisitions must change.  These changes must focus on the 
coproductive nature of services, their diversity in requirements definition, and 
their intangible outputs, which must be measured effectively to reduce risk and 
enhance the value of the DoD’s dollars spent.  Centrally managed service 
acquisition offices such as the AFPEO/CM can be a critical cornerstone from 
which agencies can build a successful services contract program. In the next 
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III. Air Force Program Executive Officer for 
Combat and Mission Support 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, we focus on the background of the Air Force Program 
Executive Office for Combat and Mission Support (AFPEO/CM).  Specifically, we 
look at the origin of the AFPEO/CM, how the office is structured and, most 
important, the processes and procedures that the AFPEO/CM uses to effectively 
manage the service contracts that fall under its authority.  The policy and 
procedure information in this chapter comes directly from documents and 
presentations supplied by the AFPEO/CM through briefings, interviews, and 
PowerPoint presentations.  Neither the interview transcripts nor the presentations 
are available through the Internet1, and, as a result, they are cited as personal 
communications throughout this chapter. 
B. History 
According to a senior Air Force leader we interviewed in 2011, the Air 
Force established the AFPEO for Services (AFPEO/SV) under the Under 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisitions (SAF/AQ) in March 2002.  The 
purpose of the AFPEO/SV was to implement the FY2002 NDAA requirement for 
service contract oversight equivalent to major systems acquisitions (Poussard, 
2005).  To fulfill the requirement, the AFPEO/SV oversaw services acquisitions 
over $100 million and dispersed lessons learned for all service acquisitions in the 
Air Force (including acquisitions under $100 million).  The Air Force senior leader 
we interviewed also related that the AFPEO/SV’s name changed to AFPEO for 
Combat and Mission Support to avoid confusion with the Air Force Services 
career field. 
                                            
1 Our interview transcripts and the AFPEO/CM presentations are not available on the Internet 
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C. Organization 
The Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Combat and Mission Support is 
a flag-level (i.e., general) officer or civilian Senior Executive Service (SES) 
equivalent that is the person responsible for the service acquisitions.  The PEO 
and his or her office (AFPEO/CM) report directly to the Air Force Senior 
Acquisition Executive (SAE).  The PEO has a deputy as well as three acquisition 
teams, an action group, and a legal support element (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011).  The acquisition teams are each responsible for 
supporting the various Air Force MAJCOMs, and the action group implements 
the policies and procedures for managing the Air Force’s large service contracts.  
The teams have a mixture of personnel from the contracting career field (GS-
1102 series civilians but no 64P military officers) and program managers (GS-
1101 series civilians and 63A military officers; R. Clarke, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011).  To carry out the tasks required as the senior 
manager of Air Force service acquisitions, the PEO receives a charter from the 
Air Force SAE that outlines his or her duties and responsibilities (AFPEO/CM, 
personal communication, July 15, 2011).    
D. Processes and Procedures 
The AFPEO/CM utilizes many processes and procedures to manage the 
Air Force’s large service contracts, including the utilization of delegation 
schemes, expectation management agreements (EMAs), annual reviews, peer 
reviews, requirements reviews, early acquisition planning, training, and auditing.  
Although none of these processes is unique, when the AFPEO/CM combines 
them, they provide a powerful tool for accomplishing the office’s mission.  All 
information from this section was taken directly from a binder of internal 
documents provided by the AFPEO/CM entitled Background Information 
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E. Delegation Schemes 
To manage the responsibility of all Air Force service acquisitions programs 
worldwide, the AFPEO/CM has developed a robust delegation scheme that 
involves the use of tiered thresholds of responsibility that each MAJCOM can 
earn upon completion and sustainment of certain program management 
expectations.  These expectations include providing or accomplishing the 
following: (1) a general officer or SES champion for services at the MAJCOM 
(AFPEO/CM requests the assignment of a services advocate at each MAJCOM); 
(2) a services management agreement signed between the AFPEO/CM and the 
MAJCOM commander/vice commander; (3) demonstrated learning; (4) proactive, 
multi-functional team involvement; (5) timely MAJCOM reporting to the 
AFPEO/CM; (6) metrics; and (7) AFPEO/CM participation in source selection 
stages.  The AFPEO/CM labels these delegation levels from low to high as basic, 
silver, gold, and platinum.  At each level, the AFPEO/CM relinquishes higher 
levels of authority, responsibility, and qualifications (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011). 
The basic delegation level includes passing down authority for acquisitions 
valued at less than or equal to $100 million.  Responsibility ranges through the 
entire acquisition process from the acquisition strategy panel (ASP) to 
administration of the contract. The qualifications are statutory and regulatory in 
nature.  The silver delegation level includes passing authority for acquisitions 
valued at less than or equal to $500 million.  Responsibilities include the ASP, 
with status reporting to the AFPEO/CM beginning with the requirements 
document.  The AFPEO/CM gives the qualifications to each MAJCOM initially on 
a probationary basis with regular, real-time oversight to determine a joint 
definition of success.  If the MAJCOM maintains a good standing, the 
AFPEO/CM grants full-time silver status with the potential to advance to the 
highest level of gold status when needed (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, 
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The gold delegation level grants the authority to manage acquisitions 
valued at less than or equal to $1 billion.  Responsibilities include source 
selection decision authority, award fee plan approval, and award fee determining 
official responsibilities.  The ASP and acquisition plan remain with the 
AFPEO/CM.  To qualify for this delegation, MAJCOMs must demonstrate 
success with programs under $500 million for 1–2 years.  Finally, the AFPEO/CM 
gives the platinum delegation level to specified officials for full responsibility.  To 
qualify, these officials must demonstrate proactive, full-spectrum services 
management and oversight for all acquisitions under $1 billion (AFPEO/CM, 
personal communication, July 15, 2011). 
F. Expectation Management Agreements 
The AFPEO/CM and each MAJCOM commander signs expectation 
management agreements (EMAs) that outline the roles and responsibilities of the 
MAJCOMs and the AFPEO/CM to jointly manage and oversee each level of 
delegated services.  For instance, all MAJCOMs start with an EMA assigning 
them a probationary delegation to silver; the EMA discusses the responsibilities 
of the AFPEO/CM (see Figure 9), MAJCOM commander (see Figure 10) and 
MAJCOM service advocate (see Figure 11).  Additionally, the EMA addresses 
how the MAJCOM can retain its current level of delegated authority as well as 
the steps needed to move to the next highest level of delegable authority in 
services management.  Finally, the EMA details points of contact (POCs), 
modification terms, and commencement and expiration dates.  The AFPEO/CM 
goes one step further by providing templates for the MAJCOM commander to 
distribute the new policy on services acquisition within their MAJCOM 
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Figure 9. AFPEO/CM Responsibilities Under EMA 
 
Figure 10. MAJCOM/CC Responsibilities Under EMA 
- Coordinate with the SAE
- Special interest acquisitions
- Acquisitions greater than $1B
- Briefings and notifications
- Provide advice
- Assist in training
- Provide formats and templates
- Keep MAJCOMs up-to-date on current issues
- Provide feedback to MAJCOMs acquisition 
and oversight of services
- Participate in annual reviews
- Foster an environment of continuous improvement
- Create a transparent requirements review process 
(IAW AFI 63-101)
- Coordinate Service Advocate replacements with 
AFPEO/CM
- Support the Services Advocate in developing 
disciplined multi-functional processes and teams
- Provide oversight and management of MAJCOM 
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Figure 11. MAJCOM Service Advocate Responsibilities Under EMA 
G. MAJCOM Services Program Health 
The AFPEO/CM has a robust template (see Appendix D) for analyzing the 
overall “health” of a MAJCOM’s services management program.  First, there is a 
single screen slide that details the current delegation level, services advocate, 
MAJCOM point of contact, PEO/CM point of contact, and the delegation level 
that the MAJCOM is currently seeking (see Appendix D).  The AFPEO/CM uses 
a stop light grading approach (red, yellow, green, or blue, with red as the worst 
grade and blue as the best) to highlight how the MAJCOM has performed in the 
areas of approach, oversight, and management.  This stop light approach grades 
each respective area from red to blue based on the MAJCOM’s performance 
(see Figure 12 for an example of the grading). 
- Serve as the principal POC for services acquisitions
- Proactively manage MAJCOM services with multi-
function teams
- Use trends identified in inspections to seek 
continuous process improvement
- Create “meaningful metrics” to assess services health 
in the MAJCOM and report to AFPEO/CM
- Proactively conduct MAJCOM services spend 
analysis for strategic sourcing and leveraging
- Serve as the Acquisition Plan Approval Authority 
and Source Selection Authority (depending on 
delegated authority),
- Champion quality assurance
- Oversee MAJCOM services programs with periodic 
reviews (details minimum level of review)
- Serve as the Service Designated Official and FDO 
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Figure 12. MAJCOM Services Program Health Forward-Looking Grade 
(AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011) 
The AFPEO/CM grades the MAJCOM’s management approach by how 
forward-looking and collaborative the MAJCOM has been as well as by how often 
it has sought continuous improvements.  Next, the AFPEO/CM defines forward-
looking (Appendix E) by the MAJCOM’s strategic use of acquisition planning, and 
faults them for the use of extension of services clauses and any sole-source 
“bridge justifications and approvals.”  Continuous improvement (Appendix F) is 
evaluated based on dedicating training resources, consistently conducting good 
ASPs, source selections, post-award administration, employing inspection 
suggestions, quickly implementing new policies, and participating in enterprise 
solutions.  The gold/platinum level is further defined by the MAJCOM, which 
conducts strategic sourcing (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 
2011).   
The AFPEO/CM gauges collaboration (Appendix G) based on how well 
the MAJCOM conducts discussions with the AFPEO/CM.  Oversight and 
management include an assessment into the MAJCOM’s program management, 
functional ownership, and fiscal responsibility.  Program management (Appendix 
H) is graded based on “timely and meaningful annual execution reviews with 
quality data and analysis” (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011).  
The annual reviews measure the MAJCOM’s services contracts management by 
evaluating performance, program problems analyzed and solved, and proper 
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ownership (Appendix I) is graded based on how well the MAJCOM works with 
multi-functional teams in its services programs.  Finally, fiscal responsibility 
(Appendix J) is an analysis of the MAJCOM’s sensible incentive and award fee 
decisions, along with the MAJCOM’s cost control, budget management, and 
management of contracts with ceilings and not-to-exceed line items (AFPEO/CM, 
personal communication, July 15, 2011).   
H. Requirements Approval Document (RAD) and Early 
Strategy and Issues Session (ESIS)  
Agencies that have new or recurring service needs that exceed $100 
million must first send a requirements approval document (RAD) through the 
MAJCOM and AFPEO/CM to the SAE for approval.  This document must be 
signed off as a genuine requirement before the acquisition strategy can begin.  
Following a signed RAD, the AFPEO/CM conducts the early strategy and issues 
session (ESIS; R. Culpepper, personal communication, July 6, 2011). 
The ESIS is a meeting conducted very early in the acquisition planning 
process (pre-acquisition strategy) between the AFPEO/CM and the program 
MAJCOM to discuss top-level strategies and issues affecting services 
acquisitions under the AFPEO/CM authority (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011).  The AFPEO/CM conducts the ESIS at least 120 
days before a scheduled ASP with the intention to help MAJCOMs map their 
ASP to reduce rework.  The meeting is meant to be a collaborative meeting 
between all stakeholders in the services program to aid in their understanding of 
the acquisition environment to prevent uncertainty and rework in the acquisition 
planning process (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011). 
I. Acquisition Strategy Panel (ASP) 
The ASP is a slideshow that steers the acquisition team through the 
acquisition strategy process.  It visually asks and answers important questions 
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strategy.  The ASP first explains the requested decisions from the panel (e.g., 
approvals and/or delegations requested, waivers, etc.).  Next, the ASP 
addresses considerations of market intelligence and requirements development 
(to include small business concerns), and detailed risk management with 
potential evaluation criteria for the award decisions (including cost and 
performance oversight).  Then, the ASP covers the solicitation and contract type 
(including type, duration, pricing structure, and any special terms and conditions).  
Finally, the ASP specifically addresses what the MAJCOM will oversee during 
the performance of the contract, how the performance will be measured, and 
concerns and recommendations from the MAJCOM (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011). 
J. Initial Evaluation Briefing (IEB) 
Following the approval of the ASP and solicitation, the AFPEO/CM is 
involved in the source selection by having the MAJCOM conduct an initial 
evaluation briefing (IEB).  The IEB is used for source-selection plans and it is 
tailored to meet the specific requirements of acquisition’s solicitation, reflective of 
the team’s evaluation.  Through the IEB, the MAJCOM outlines the initial 
evaluation of offers, determines a competitive range (if necessary), and obtains 
approval to enter discussions (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 
2011).   
K. Final Proposal Revisions Request Briefing (FPRRB) 
After establishing the competitive range, and following any discussions or 
negotiations, the MAJCOM holds a final proposal revisions request briefing 
(FPRRB).  Through this briefing, the MAJCOM explains to the SSA the items 
resolved during discussions, allows for the determination of whether meaningful 
discussions were held, and requests authority to end discussions following a final 
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L. Annual Execution Review (AER) 
After the award of a major services contract, the AFPEO/CM continues 
with oversight of the process.  The MAJCOM provides information to the 
AFPEO/CM for specific contracts for the purpose of sound management and 
oversight.  The AFPEO/CM also uses the information from the MAJCOMs to 
grade the health of its respective services programs.  All of this information is 
aggregated from multiple reporting slides that come from the MAJCOMs on all 
services acquisitions about which they are responsible for reporting.  The slide 
template, known as a quad chart (Appendix K), is a part of the AFPEO/CM 
process that captures a snapshot of the top three elements of sound services 
program management, which are cost, schedule, and performance, and it is used 
in the forum of the annual execution review (AER).  These slides provide 
background, performance status, contract basics (period, type, progress to date), 
budget status, and any pending program issues.  They further identify the 
procuring contracting office, the administering contracting office, the award fee 
determining official (if applicable), the number of quality assurance personnel, 
and the contractor employees (newer slides are breaking this out into full-time 
equivalents [FTE] and part-time equivalents [PTE]).  The program owner can 
support these slides, if necessary, with additional administrative reporting all the 
way to the task order level.  The AFPEO/CM consolidates this information into a 
so-called stop light slide that they then present as AFPEO/CM Items of Interest to 
the Air Force SAE (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011).   
The AFPEO/CM also keeps records of any services program management 
peer reviews of contract actions that have been conducted between the 
MAJCOMs.  This list details the dollar level of the review and at which stage in 
the acquisition process it took place (pre- or post-award).  Also noted are the 
general positions of the members who conducted the peer review as well as the 
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M. Training and Auditing 
The AFPEO/CM utilizes three separate training classes to inform, 
educate, and motivate acquisition professionals at different levels.  These 
courses, developed in coordination with the University of Tennessee’s Center for 
Executive Education and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), are the 
Senior Leader Awareness Course, the Just-in-Time (JIT) training, and the 
Service Acquisition Workshop.  All three courses are designed for a specific 
purpose, place, and time in the acquisition process and in the life of the multi-
function team (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011). 
The Senior Leader Awareness Course provides senior MAJCOM, 
acquisition center, and wing leadership with a high level of understanding of what 
they are required to do to manage goods and services sourcing.  It is used to 
create an understanding of the acquisition process and life cycle to permit 
leadership to make sound, informed decisions (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011). 
JIT training targets the multi-function teams in the field that are directly 
and currently involved in a major services acquisition.  This training includes 
stakeholders and team members in multiple locations and across many 
disciplines.  The training is broken into three modules that can be given 
concurrently or in stages throughout the acquisition process.  It ranges from 
topics on the baseline understanding of needs to stakeholder analysis, risk 
analysis, and market intelligence all the way through development of a 
performance plan and performance work statement (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011). 
The Services Acquisition Workshop is also a form of JIT training.  It is a 
four-day workshop that takes two facilitators directly to the location where the 
services program requirement is being created.  The trainers walk the teams 
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management.  This training is designed to build the team in place and have them 
jointly strategize the acquisition program management process (AFPEO/CM, 
personal communication, July 15, 2011). 
To top off its training initiative, the AFPEO/CM is working to create a 
services acquisition certification for non-acquisition-coded personnel that 
manage service contracts in order to “enhance awareness of the importance of 
services acquisitions, promote continuous improvement, promote 
standardization, and enhance the workforce’s skills and knowledge of services 
personnel” (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011).  The hope is 
that certification will lead to better management of services contract spending, 
raise the services program management competency, and improve the overall 
process of buying and managing services (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, 
July 15, 2011). 
Finally, the AFPEO/CM keeps detailed accounts of its current, pending, 
and closed audits on all of its major programs.  This information is used to audit 
major services program areas ranging from acquisition planning, competition, 
and surveillance to financial management and work products produced 
(AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011).  Audit results are mainly 
from the Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) and include statements of what program 
or subject is being audited, along with detailed recommendations to the 
AFPEO/CM from the AFAA.  The AFPEO/CM keeps a progress chart to stay 
involved and to make sure that the actions recommended by the audit are 
undertaken (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011). 
N. Summary 
In this chapter we provided a history of the AFPEO/CM, a description of 
how it is organized and, most important, an explanation of the processes and 
procedures that the office follows when working with the MAJCOMs to award and 
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chapter we address the methodology we used to conduct our research into the 
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IV.  Methodology 
A. Introduction 
Our structure draws almost exclusively from the GAO’s Framework.  The 
intent of this GAO report and the resultant framework was to help senior 
executives within federal agencies recognize areas requiring greater attention 
and to enable accountability offices such as the GAO and the DoD IG to identify 
areas requiring “more focused follow-up work” (GAO, 2005, p. i).  This framework 
was developed by consulting federal government and industry specialists in the 
areas of human capital, acquisition, financial management, and information 
management.  The GAO also relied heavily on its own findings in multiple GAO 
reports throughout the years.  The GAO noted that the Framework is general 
guidance for assessing acquisition functions in accordance with existing 
guidance and standards; it is not a tool for assessing specific acquisition actions 
or contracts, and it is not a replacement of existing standards and guidance.  The 
primary function of the framework is to provide executive management with the 
means to assess the strengths and weaknesses of high-level acquisition 
functions. 
Our research involved using this framework to draw out and record best 
practices and lessons learned from the Air Force’s implementation of the 
AFPEO/CM so that they could be used by the similar offices in the Army and the 
Navy.  As in any research, there are limitations.  We have focused entirely on 
Cornerstone 2 of the GAO Framework, and we have also aggregated multiple 
questions from the framework into more consolidated questions to streamline the 
interview process for senior executives (Appendix A).  Because the Army and the 
Navy have already implemented the organizational alignment of their 
AFPEO/CM-equivalent offices, we see Cornerstone 2 as being the next most 
logical area of focus in which to assist them while they fully establish their offices.  
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cornerstone element, listed as “key questions” to ask, areas to “look for” and 
“caution” indicators (GAO, 2005, p. ix).  The GAO (2005) designed the key 
questions to identify critical success factors, they also designed areas to look for 
to indicate actions that facilitate a positive acquisition outcome, and caution 
indicators show signs of practices or actions that hinder positive acquisition 
outcomes. 
Our results are formatted in a similar manner as previous best practice 
reports produced by the GAO.  We developed our general report outline and 
summary of results from a review of previous GAO best practice reports and 
testimonies.  These GAO reports and testimonies are segmented into areas of 
best practice with tables illustrating a side-by-side comparison of the system or 
organization and its previous practices or its competitor’s practices. 
B. Data Collection Process 
To best study the AFPEO/CM, we conducted oral interviews with 
members of the current AFPEO/CM, with the leaders that established the office, 
and with other key stakeholders and customers to identify responses that 
indicated both best practices and areas of caution in accordance with 
Cornerstone 2 of the GAO Framework.  To broaden our study’s sample, we 
asked each interviewee to recommend additional interview subjects—a method 
called chain or snowball sampling (Patton, 2002).  The first interview subjects we 
selected were the current acting Program Executive Officer for Combat and 
Mission Support at the AFPEO/CM, Mr. Randall Culpepper, and its most recent 
Program Executive Officer, Major General Wendy Masiello.  These two 
individuals gave us the top-level perspective of how the AFPEO/CM operates 
and some of the rationale behind the current policies.  Using the snowball 
sampling method, these first two interviewees gave us recommendations to 
interview other previous Combat and Mission Support Program Executive 
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We conducted most of the interviews over the phone, except our meeting with 
the AFPEO/CM division leaders, which was at their office in Washington, DC. 
Finally, we had the interview responses transcribed, and then we reviewed 
the transcripts for key comments, phrases, and process indicators that matched 
the best practices and caution indicators listed in the GAO Framework, 
Cornerstone 2.  Specifically, we both reviewed the transcripts individually and 
highlighted the important best practices and lessons learned.  Because we 
performed each interview as a team, and because the interview questions were 
focused on the best practices and lessons learned, our reviews of the transcripts 
largely uncovered the same findings.  In the few instances when our reviews did 
not match, we discussed the differences and combined our findings.  The results 
of these statements we reviewed were the primary source of the best practice 
and lessons learned inputs that we compiled, which are listed in Chapter V. 
C. Cornerstones 
After reviews and consultations, the GAO constructed its final framework 
into four main areas or cornerstones.  These cornerstones are as follows: (1) 
organizational alignment and leadership, (2) policies and processes, (3) human 
capital, and (4) knowledge and information management.  These cornerstones 
are interrelated and serve as effective indicators of the efficiency, effectiveness, 
and accountability of an acquisition process.  The GAO developed each 
cornerstone with a complete list of elements and critical success factors.  The 
GAO identified the elements crucial to successful organizational stewardship and 
the elements that were dependent upon the critical success factors listed.  The 
framework answers the question of whether an organization is meeting the 
critical success factors with three indicators: (1) questions to ask, (2) situations to 
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1. Cornerstone 2—Policies and Processes 
Cornerstone 2 of the GAO Framework consists of three main elements 
and eight critical success factors.  These elements and factors are used to 
assess how well an agency is “implementing the acquisition function” (GAO, 
2005, p. 11).  Cornerstone 2 explains how well the organization defines its roles, 
empowers its people across the acquisition organization, and strategically plans 
to manage the acquisition process in such a way that meets the established 
expectations of its stakeholders (GAO, 2005). 
a. Element 1 
Element 1, titled Planning Strategically, asks questions regarding the 
critical success factors of (1) partnering with internal organizations and (2) 
assessing internal requirements and the impact of external events.  Planning 
strategically involves managing relationships within the acquisition process, 
strategically analyzing and planning for aggregate needs, and considering the 
effects of the appropriations process and external forces on the implementation 
of major contracts.  Answering the first critical success factor indicates how well 
the agency collaborates with internal organizations such as the end users, 
finance management, and legal personnel.  Research shows that multi-
disciplinary approaches to acquisition generally result in more effective mission 
support (GAO, 2002).  The second critical success factor indicates how well the 
agency conducts market research and acquisition planning based on the 
agency’s competence in reviewing the commercial market, leveraging buying 
power, and analyzing aggregate needs while considering appropriations and 
legislative timing and constraints (GAO, 2005). 
b. Element 2 
Element 2, titled Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process, asks 
questions regarding the critical success factors, continuing from Element1, of (3) 
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monitoring and providing oversight to achieve desired outcomes, and (6) 
enabling financial accountability.  Effectively managing the acquisition process 
involves looking at the critical success factors that ensure that agencies manage 
contracts from cradle to grave.  It considers the agencies’ success in monitoring 
cost, schedule, and performance until the contract is closed out.  Answering the 
third critical success factor indicates how well the agency implements teams that 
have the proper mix of technical expertise, knowledge, and credibility to properly 
define needs, select suppliers, and manage the acquisition process to ensure the 
lowest possible total life cycle cost.  Answering the fourth critical success factor 
indicates how well the agency teams with suppliers and manages that 
relationship.  Cooperative supplier relationships have been shown to directly lead 
to improvements in cost, schedule, and performance in leading organizations 
with effective feedback systems (GAO, 2002).  The fifth critical success factor is 
another focus area that shows how well organizations monitor cost, schedule, 
and performance by using effective oversight such as earned value management 
(EVM).  The sixth and final critical success factor in Element 2 assesses how well 
agency functions provide sufficient financial data in a manner that is timely, 
relevant, and reliable enough to reduce the risk of inefficient or wasteful 
acquisition practices (GAO, 2005).   
c. Element 3 
Element 3, titled Promoting Successful Outcomes of Major Projects, asks 
questions regarding the critical success factors of (7) using sound capital 
investment strategies, and (8) employing knowledge-based acquisition 
approaches.  Element 3 looks at these critical success factors to determine how 
well agencies monitor, analyze, and support their capital-intensive projects and 
contracts with the longest terms.  The seventh critical success factor indicates 
how well an agency integrates the overall mission and goals into its capital-
intensive programs, invests its resources in its major projects, and considers total 
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manages knowledge to control cost, schedule, performance, and quality.  It 
involves the agencies’ perceived consideration for resource matching, design 
stability, and production process maturity as key knowledge points in planning 
and managing the acquisition process (GAO, 2005). 
D. Summary 
In this chapter, we provided a basic overview of our best practice report 
format and the GAO Framework.  We also discussed the outline of the 
Framework, the study’s primary focus of Cornerstone 2, and its related elements.  
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V. Findings, Results, and Recommendations 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss the results of our interviews in terms of the 
primary research question:  What are the best practices within the AFPEO/CM 
structure?  Furthermore, we address the secondary questions: What are the 
primary lessons learned from working with the AFPEO/CM, and what 
recommendations should the Army and the Navy incorporate in order to develop 
a senior manager position for service acquisition? In this chapter we present the 
results of the interviews we conducted with the current and some previous 
AFPEO/CM leaders, program managers, key customers, and other external 
stakeholders.  During the  interviews, we asked questions that the GAO designed 
to draw out areas indentified in Cornerstone 2 of its Framework as best practices 
(identified as items to look for within the GAO report) and caution areas 
(identified as cautions; GAO, 2005).   
Furthermore, in this study we draw out lessons learned from the 
AFPEO/CM as well as recommendations for the Army and Navy in establishing 
positions for senior managers for services acquisitions.  We also outline 
recommendations for the Army and Navy in the context of the aforementioned 
GAO Framework, Cornerstone 2.  As mentioned in Chapter IV of this research 
report, the entire GAO Framework is broken out into areas for each cornerstone 
element listed as key questions to ask, areas to look for, and caution indicators 
(GAO, 2005).  The GAO (2005) designed the key questions to identify critical 
success factors, they also designed areas to look for to indicate actions that 
facilitate a positive acquisition outcome, and caution indicators show signs of 
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B. Administration of the Interviews 
We identified the interviewees by looking for the past and present 
Program Executive Officers from the AFPEO/CM.  We conducted interviews with 
three key external stakeholders (two from the Acquisition Management & 
Integration Center [AMIC] and the Air Force Chief Information Officer) and with 
eight current and former officials from the AFPEO/CM.  In total, we interviewed 
11 individuals.  During our interviews, the past and present Program Executive 
Officers recommended the names of the stakeholder and AFPEO/CM program 
managers that we interviewed, creating the snowball sample identified in Chapter 
IV of this report. 
We conducted interviews through recorded telephone interviews for seven 
of the personnel.  We interviewed the program managers from the AFPEO/CM in 
person with audio recording.  The current acting Program Executive Officer for 
Combat and Mission Support at the AFPEO/CM, Mr. Randy Culpepper, went 
through the full 24-question interview that closely mirrored the key questions from 
the GAO Framework.  All other interviewees received the abridged nine-question 
interview that addressed the key questions of this study.  After the first interview 
with Mr. Culpepper, we discovered that interviewees could answer or address 
our primary and secondary research questions if we used only the abridged list.  
By answering Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 16, 18, 21, and 22 from our list of 
interview questions (Appendix A), the interviewees effectively addressed the 
areas to look for and the caution indicators from Cornerstone 2 of the GAO 
Framework. 
C. Results of the Interviews and Best Practice Study 
In this section we identify the results of our interviews.  We consolidated 
the interview results into each element and critical success factor from 
Cornerstone 2 of the GAO Framework to show a comparison between the GAO’s 
critical success factor and the AFPEO/CM’s initiatives that meet these criteria.  
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Additionally, we compiled the interview results involving lessons learned and 
recommendations for the Army and Navy into a list for ease of use. 
1. Element 1: Planning Strategically 
Element 1, Planning Strategically, addresses how well the agency 
collaborates with internal organizations such as the end users, finance, and legal 
personnel, and how well the agency conducts market research and acquisition 
planning based on the agency’s competence in reviewing the commercial 
market, leveraging buying power, and analyzing aggregate needs while 
considering fiscal appropriations and legislative timing and constraints (GAO, 
2005). This element focuses on the broader strategic areas in which acquisitions 
occur and the degree of detail in planning acquisitions (GAO, 2005).  Our 
interviews produced the findings in Table 1. 
Table 1. AFPEO/CM Best Practices From Element 1 
GAO Best Practice from Cornerstone 
2, Element 1: Planning Strategically 
AFPEO/CM Best Practices 
a. Partnering with Internal 
Organizations 
(1) Official Charter with SAE 
(2) Delegation Scheme 
(3) Services Program Health 
(4) Services Workshop 
b. Assessing Internal Requirements and 
the Impact of External Events 
(1) Advance Procurement  Planning 
(2) Requirements Validation Process 
(3) External Political Factors Anticipation
(4) Early Strategies and Issues Session 
(5) Enterprise Vantage Point 
(6) Full-Time Market Intelligence  Expert
a. Partnering With Internal Organizations 
We identified four major best practices in the area of partnering with 
internal organizations from the AFPEO/CM.  This area of the GAO Framework 
focuses on empowering stakeholders while holding them accountable, on 
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sharing lessons learned, and on coordination of stakeholders in the acquisition 
strategy development and implementation process (GAO, 2005).   
(1). Official Charter with Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE).  First, the 
AFPEO/CM signs a charter with the Air Force SAE acknowledging 
its duties and responsibilities.  This charter expressly identifies that 
the AFPEO/CM must operate as the responsible management 
official, providing overall direction and guidance for services 
acquisition.  Further, the charter expresses that the AFPEO/CM 
must establish an Air Force Services requirements process, set up 
a source selection improvement process, and improve program 
management and oversight of services acquisitions.  Finally, the 
charter expresses that the AFPEO/CM is responsible for managing 
the life cycle of services acquisitions and alludes to the life cycle 
approach to services acquisitions identified in Apte and Rendon’s 
(2007) research.   
(2). Delegation Scheme.  To pass these responsibilities to the field, the 
AFPEO/CM has developed a comprehensive delegation scheme, 
which includes expectation management agreements (EMAs) that 
force MAJCOMs to realize their contract execution potential and 
create an introspective look into their abilities (R. Poussard, 
personal communication, June 29, 2011).  This delegation scheme 
empowers the MAJCOMs and creates a greater sense of 
accountability (W. Masiello, personal communication, July 7, 2011).  
Additionally, the delegation scheme acts as a prime motivator 
toward good services acquisition development (R. Culpepper, 
personal communication, July 6, 2011).  Finally, the use of a 
comprehensive delegation scheme allows the small staff at 
AFPEO/CM to leverage their expertise and provide guidance for 
maximum effectiveness.  The AFPEO/CM uses the delegations as 
a grooming process for MAJCOMs to become internal experts in 
high-dollar and more complex services acquisitions in the future.  In 
keeping with the GAO Framework's critical success factors, this 
delegation scheme shows strong signs of empowering stakeholders 
and holding them accountable, while supporting the agency 
structure requiring appropriate coordination between stakeholders 
for requirements and acquisition strategy development. 
(3). Services Program Health.  The MAJCOM services program health 
briefings, explained in Chapter III of this report, are another strong 
example of partnering with internal organizations.  The services 
program health briefings work with the delegation scheme to 
assess the relative competencies of how the MAJCOMs handle 
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AFPEO/CM grades the MAJCOMs more favorably and provides a 
higher degree of empowerment for proving that they have a forward 
looking perspective, seek continuous improvements, collaborate to 
solve problems, have sound program management, and 
demonstrate functional ownership and fiscal responsibility.  This 
assessment adds to the GAO’s critical success factor indicators of 
empowering stakeholders and holding them accountable, 
continuous work among stakeholders to define key business drivers 
and understand each other’s needs, and requiring appropriate 
coordination for developing and implementing strategy among 
stakeholders. 
(4). Services Workshop.  The training and lessons learned provided in 
the AFPEO/CM services workshop held every 12 to 18 months has 
also been identified as a best practice by multiple interviewees.  
Attendees discuss hot-button items within the services contracting 
arena and share services acquisition information.  This information-
sharing goes from the AFPEO/CM to the field and from members in 
the field to other members in the field.  According to Mr. Rob Clarke 
(personal communication, July 15, 2011) at the AFPEO/CM, the 
workshop is “where we’re going to get the next level of benefit ... 
when the field starts talking with each other and they start sharing 
ideas and then they’re going to come up with better ways of doing 
stuff.”  This workshop adds directly to the GAO critical success 
factor of identifying lessons learned and sharing them among 
stakeholders. Furthermore, it addresses the need for strong 
coordination efforts between stakeholders in the acquisition 
planning process. 
b. Assessing Internal Requirements and the Impact of 
External Events 
We identified six major best practices in assessing internal requirements 
and in the impact of external events area.  These areas of the GAO Framework 
(2005) focus on strategically assessing needs, leveraging purchase volume, and 
systematically identifying and analyzing “agency-wide acquisitions planned in the 
next 12 to 24 months” (p. 15).  Additionally, the Framework focuses on reviews of 
planned acquisitions, determining work to be performed in-house, agency 
assessments of core-competencies and commercial items, tracking of pending 
legislation affecting policies and processes, planning for unforeseen events, and 
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(1).  Advance Procurement Planning.  The AFPEO/CM’s advanced 
acquisition planning is one of its most important and relevant critical 
success factors.  The AFPEO/CM requires each MAJCOM to plan 
service acquisitions 24 months in advance.  This planning window 
allows time to plan and analyze alternatives to the current 
acquisition method.  The AFPEO/CM and the requiring agencies 
use this time to validate requirements before they develop an 
acquisition strategy.  These early planning sessions work on a loop 
that feeds information back into their delegation scheme and the 
AFPEO/CM uses it as a direct measure of success in getting the 
contracts awarded on time.  
(2). Requirements Validation Process.  There is a formal requirements 
approval document (RAD) for acquisitions over $100 million that the 
Air Force SAE must approve before the acquisition process can 
start.  These advanced acquisition planning methods meet the 
GAO Framework's critical success factors by strategically 
assessing the Air Force’s services needs within the 12- to 24-month 
timeframe (R. Culpepper, personal communication, July 6, 2011), 
while also considering and determining how much work can be 
done in-house and assessing the agency’s core competencies.  
These efforts work in concert with the Air Force’s Enterprise 
Sourcing Group’s mission to strategically source requirements for 
the Air Force. 
(3). External Political Factors Anticipation.  The AFPEO/CM has also 
shown the ability to address pending legislation issues that affect its 
acquisition policies, procedures, training, and workload (GAO, 
2005).  For example, the office worked with the Air Education and 
Training Command (AETC) to identify aspects of food service laws 
that would have created a lapse in service.  Additionally, the 
AFPEO/CM grades MAJCOMs on how well they provide 
communication and feedback, which encourages a cross-flow of 
information to head off potential problems, similar to the AETC 
example (R. Culpepper, personal communication, July 6, 2011).  In 
keeping with this proactive approach, the AFPEO/CM has started to 
keep track of full-time equivalent contract employees in anticipation 
of congressional interest in this area.  This example shows a high 
degree of forward-looking planning for policies and processes. 
(4). Early Strategies and Issues Sessions.  The best practice most often 
identified by all interviewees was the use of early strategies and 
issues sessions (ESIS).  All AFPEO/CM stakeholders we 
interviewed labeled the ESIS as a best practice.  The ESIS creates 
and opportunity for dialogue in which the users can come and talk 
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(ASP).  The ESIS also allows teams to go over what-if scenarios 
that may become problems later, including external events, political 
considerations, and any other concerns.  Most interviewees 
highlighted the informal nature of the meeting and the ease of 
communicating their ideas, issues, and concerns.  All interviewees 
indicated that it reduced rework normally associated with an ASP 
developed without an ESIS.  The ESIS falls under the critical 
success factors of the agency having a mechanism for reviewing 
planned acquisitions, further assessing core competencies, 
assessing the response to unforeseen events and emergencies, 
strategically assessing need, and considering competing demands. 
(5). Enterprise Vantage Point.  The Air Force stood up the Enterprise 
Sourcing Group in October 2010 to strategically source the 
acquisition of goods and services.  The AFPEO/CM works directly 
with the Enterprise Sourcing Group on all service acquisitions 
above $100 million.  This concerted effort between offices creates a 
method to identify enterprise purchasing that the Air Force can 
leverage for strategic sourcing.  This collaboration also allows the 
AFPEO/CM to strategically assess its needs and develop 
enterprise sourcing plans.  Furthermore, the AFPEO/CM has 
shown enterprise visibility across MAJCOMs by being the conduit 
for major services acquisitions.  As a result, the Air Force has 
started to regionalize advisory and assistance services (A&AS) 
contracts in Air Combat Command and the Air Force District of 
Washington.  Recently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
asked the AFPEO/CM to look across the DoD in an effort to create 
an enterprise solution for A&AS (R. Culpepper, personal 
communication, July 6, 2011). 
(6). Full-Time Market Intelligence Expert.  The AFPEO/CM recently 
employed a full-time market intelligence expert to look across 
multiple portfolios of services and determine areas and disciplines 
that can be combined and/or leveraged for strategic sourcing (R. 
Culpepper, personal communication, July 6, 2011).  This type of 
analysis gives a deeper look into the market using industry and 
spend analysis to find opportunities to bundle taxonomies of service 
and/or regionalize to leverage spend volume.  This effort directly 
addresses the GAO Framework’s critical success factors of 
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2. Element 2: Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process 
Element 2, Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process, asks questions 
regarding the critical success factors that indicate how well agencies manage 
acquisitions after contract award has been made.  These factors focus on how 
well agencies manage cost, schedule, and performance requirements of 
contracts through the use of cross-functional teams, managing suppliers, 
providing oversight, and “implementing sound financial accountability measures” 
(GAO, 2005).  Our interviews produced the findings shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. AFPEO/CM Best Practices From Element 2 
GAO Best Practice from 
Cornerstone 2, Element 2: 
Effectively Managing the 
Acquisition Process 
AFPEO/CM Best Practices 
a. Empowering Cross-Functional 
Teams 
(1) Services Program Health 
(2) Delegation Scheme 
(3) Services Workshop 
b. Managing and Engaging Suppliers (1) AFPEO/CM  and Service 
 Advocates at MAJCOM Level 
(2) Industry Days 
(3) Identifying Key Vendors 
c. Monitoring and Providing Oversight 
to Achieve Desired Outcomes 
(1) Annual Execution Review  
(2) Expectation Management 
 Agreements 
(3) Services Acquisition Air Force 
 Instruction 
d. Enabling Financial Accountability (1) Annual Execution Review  
(2) Delegation Scheme 
(3) Services Program Health 
a. Empowering Cross-Functional Teams 
The AFPEO/CM has three major best practices in the critical success 
factor of empowering cross-functional teams.  This area of the GAO Framework 
focuses on using cross-functional teams in acquisitions, empowering the teams, 
incentivizing the teams, communicating within the teams, holding the team 
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the team’s cost, schedule, and performance goals (GAO, 2005).  For example, 
strong cross-functional teams in acquisition include personnel from the 
departments of contracting, finance, legal, operations, and program 
management. 
(1). Services Program Health.  Interviewees noted the services program 
health briefing again under this critical success factor as an 
important best practice by the AFPEO/CM.  From the perspective of 
empowering cross-functional teams, the services program health 
briefings help meet the intent of the GAO Framework by creating a 
two-way feedback mechanism to enhance communication between 
the AFPEO/CM and MAJCOMs.  This briefing also allows 
MAJCOMs to assess themselves first, and then lets the 
AFPEO/CM evaluate them to see how well they assessed 
themselves.  The AFPEO/CM provides the final grade. However, 
the AFPEO/CM uses the grade as a judgment of how much 
acquisition support the MAJCOMs need, not to show how well or 
poorly they are performing. The intent of the grading system and 
briefing is to establish an open and continuous dialogue between 
the AFPEO/CM and the field.  This practice shows open, honest, 
and clear communication between the teams and the AFPEO/CM 
as well as helps to monitor the project’s performance to facilitate 
positive acquisition outcomes.   
(2). Delegation Scheme.  In line with the services health briefings is the 
delegation scheme.  From the perspective of empowering cross-
functional teams, the AFPEO/CM uses the delegation scheme 
previously mentioned to monitor and control its acquisition portfolio 
by making the large volume of projects manageable and easier to 
control.  Furthermore, the delegation scheme directly incentivizes 
the MAJCOMs by giving them accountability for project plan goals 
in specific acquisitions as well as in their annual performances 
within their entire service acquisition portfolio.  This delegation 
meets the area to look for in the GAO Framework’s regarding the 
agency’s systematic monitoring of project performance and the 
establishment of accountability controls and incentives (GAO, 
2005). 
(3). Services Workshop.  The services workshops held by the 
AFPEO/CM were identified again as a best practice with regard to 
empowering cross-functional teams.  To facilitate open, honest, and 
clear communication (GAO, 2005), the AFPEO/CM held initial 
services workshops with key stakeholders and customers to explain 
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AFPEO/CM holds these workshops every 18 months to provide an 
exchange of information from AFPEO/CM to the field and from the 
field to the AFPEO/CM, and to provide roundtable discussions from 
field to field stakeholders and customers.  The initial services 
workshops were comprised almost entirely of contracting personnel 
from the various MAJCOMs, but recently they have been 
comprised of a 50/50 mix of contracting personnel and multi-
functional team representatives (i.e., representatives from the 
finance, legal, operations, and program management departments; 
AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011).  This best 
practice shows encouragement for the use of cross-functional 
teams in a manner that is evolving into a more dynamic mix of 
stakeholders as it continues.  Lessons learned and hot-button items 
are discussed and shared from across the Air Force by acquisition 
professionals who have experiences in the field as well as by 
MAJCOM professionals who have specific experiences from 
working with the AFPEO/CM (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011). 
b. Managing and Engaging Suppliers 
In our interviews we identified three best practices from the AFPEO/CM in 
managing and engaging suppliers.  The GAO Framework states that cooperative 
business relationships relate to lower costs, higher quality, and shorter lead-
times (GAO, 2005).  Agencies can achieve these relationships by placing 
supplier management as a core business strategy, by utilizing strong supplier 
evaluation criteria, and by maintaining positive and continuous communication 
and feedback (GAO, 2005).   
(1). AFPEO/CM and Service Advocates at MAJCOM Level.  The 
AFPEO/CM meets the intent of managing and engaging suppliers 
at an enterprise level solely by its existence and mandated 
involvement in acquisitions over $100 million.  In practice, the 
AFPEO/CM establishes service advocates at each MAJCOM.  This 
practice of assigning a services advocate meets the GAO 
Framework’s critical success factors by establishing “managers for 
key goods and services” who are “actively involved in defining 
requirements with internal clients, negotiating with potential 
providers of goods and services, and assisting in resolving 
performance or other issues after the contract is awarded” (GAO, 
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(2). Industry Days.  Industry days and vendor fairs are common 
practices for gathering market information for future acquisitions.  
The AFPEO/CM has utilized these practices in a unique way to 
explain to the market what its function is as the PEO and how they 
plan to interface with the market, as opposed to just asking the 
market to explain its capabilities.  This unique approach to supplier 
engagement highlights a strong communication and feedback 
practice between the agency and the service provider base that 
falls directly within the criteria explained in the GAO Framework.   
(3). Identifying Key Vendors.  Finally, the AFPEO/CM uses Federal 
Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data to 
determine the key vendors within spending portfolios and uses 
requests for information to get industry’s inputs on potential ways to 
improve future services acquisitions.  In addition, the AFPEO/CM 
recently hired a market intelligence expert to address the best ways 
to optimize these spending portfolios at a strategic level.  This 
strategic view directly addresses the GAO Framework criteria for 
having an agency process for identifying key suppliers (GAO, 
2005). 
c. Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired 
Outcomes 
We noted three best practices in our interviews with personnel from the 
AFPEO/CM regarding monitoring and providing oversight.  The GAO Framework 
states that, due to the DoD’s high reliance on contractor personnel to carry out 
mission requirements, they need effective oversight processes and trained staff 
to oversee and ensure the effectiveness of contractor performance.  
Effectiveness, as defined in the GAO Framework, is measured across the 
spectrums of cost, schedule, and performance (GAO, 2005). 
(1). Annual Execution Review.  The use of quad charts (see Appendix 
K) and an annual execution review (AER) by the AFPEO/CM to 
help it track acquisition methods, incentives, cost, schedule, and 
performance goals for service acquisitions under its purview is an 
example of monitoring and providing oversight.  The quad charts 
are also used in monitoring award fee decisions.  In a single frame, 
managers can see the scope of work, budget and cost, 
performance history, issues, and contract type and methods.  This 
efficiently and effectively creates a common language with which to 
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personal communication, July 7, 2011).  The AER and quad charts 
help the AFPEO/CM monitor quality assurance evaluator and 
contracting officer representative (COR) support to see if 
MAJCOMs are using the right number of evaluators and 
representatives.  The use of these AERs and quad charts directly 
addresses the GAO Framework's concerns that agencies ensure 
personnel have the appropriate skills, knowledge, and 
responsibilities to monitor service acquisitions, and that agencies 
have the tools to track acquisition methods and control effective 
oversight (GAO, 2005). 
(2). Expectation Management Agreements.  Meeting the GAO 
Framework’s concerns for clearly defining roles and responsibilities 
for those who manage and oversee these contracts, the 
AFPEO/CM uses expectation management agreements (EMAs) at 
the highest levels in the Air Force.  The EMA discusses the 
responsibilities of the AFPEO/CM (see Figure 9), MAJCOM 
commander (see Figure 10) and MAJCOM service advocate (see 
Figure 11).  The AFPEO/CM goes one step further by providing 
templates for the MAJCOM/CC to distribute the new policy on 
services acquisition within the MAJCOM (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011). 
(3). Services Acquisition Air Force Instruction.  The AFPEO/CM is 
currently developing a comprehensive Air Force Instruction (AFI) 
for services acquisition.  This effort will aid in defining service 
acquisition roles, responsibilities, and processes and in providing 
knowledge and training to service acquisition personnel.  The intent 
of separating the material in Chapter 4 of AFI 63-101 into a 
standalone AFI is to make it more forceful and to ensure that it is 
not “perceived as … [being in the 63 series] … that doesn’t apply to 
me type of thing” (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 
2011). 
d. Enabling Financial Accountability 
We noted three best practices from the AFPEO/CM in the subject criteria 
of enabling financial accountability.  We already noted all of these best practices 
in other critical areas, but we address them here to show their applicability in this 
dimension of sound acquisition function policies and processes.  This GAO 
Framework critical success factor relates to helping agencies provide goods and 
services within diminishing budgets by tracking and communicating useful, 
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collective use of these tools allows the AFPEO/CM to monitor financial 
accountability while providing incentives for MAJCOMs to follow, record, and test 
the validity of cost, schedule, and performance status.   
(1). Annual Execution Review.  The AERs are critical to providing the 
AFPEO/CM, and ultimately the SAE, with frequent reports of cost, 
schedule, and performance metrics from contracts.  The AER slides 
provide background, performance status, contract basics (period, 
type, progress to date), budget status, and any pending program 
issues.  The AFPEO/CM can monitor cost ceilings to ensure they 
are not breached well in advance of a program problem through the 
slides. This monitoring directly aids in the timely and relevant 
processing of financial data in the service acquisitions. 
(2). Delegation Scheme.  The delegation scheme takes the MAJCOM’s 
Service Program Health assessments into consideration when 
determining what level of delegation to bestow on the MAJCOM 
(basic to platinum).  As discussed in Chapter III of this report, the 
AFPEO/CM has developed a robust delegation scheme that 
involves the use of tiered thresholds of responsibility available to 
each respective MAJCOM upon completion and sustainment of 
certain program management expectations. 
(3). Services Program Health.  MAJCOMs are assessed in the services 
program health briefings on their fiscal responsibility (Appendix J) 
based on their prudent decision-making for incentive and award 
fees along with the MAJCOM’s cost control, budget management, 
and management of contracts with ceilings and not-to-exceed line 
items (AFPEO/CM, personal communication, July 15, 2011).  
3. Element 3: Promoting Successful Outcomes of Major Projects 
Element 3, Promoting Successful Outcomes of Major Projects, asks 
questions regarding how well agencies monitor, analyze, and support their 
capital-intensive projects and contracts with the longest terms, how well an 
agency integrates the overall mission and goals into its capital-intensive 
programs, invests its resources in its major projects, and considers total life cycle 
costs and how well the agency manages knowledge to control cost, schedule, 
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monitoring because they span longer terms and expend significant resources 
(GAO, 2005).  Our interviews produced the results in Table 3. 
Table 3. AFPEO/CM Best Practices From Element 3 
GAO Best Practice from 
Cornerstone 2, Element 3: 
Promoting Successful Outcomes of 
Major Projects 
AFPEO/CM Best Practices 
a. Using Sound Capital Investment 
Strategies 
(1) Advance Procurement Planning 
(2) Requirements Validation 
Process 
(3) Delegation Scheme 
b. Employing Knowledge-Based 
Acquisition Approaches 
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a. Using Sound Capital Investment Strategies 
The GAO’s (2005) capital investment critical success factor analyzes  how 
agencies manage infrastructure-type projects.  Although the AFPEO/CM is only 
responsible for service acquisitions, some of the underlying principles of this 
critical success factor still apply.  Specifically, the GAO (2005) identified the need 
for an annual “needs assessment” (p. 23) and for identifying “appropriate levels 
of management review and approval” (p. 24) based on the acquisition’s 
complexity.  Under the needs assessment and reviews, we identified three best 
practices from the AFPEO/CM. 
(1). Advance Procurement Planning.  For needs assessment, the 
AFPEO/CM conducts a robust advanced acquisition planning 
process.  As mentioned previously, the AFPEO/CM analyzes 
pending acquisitions 24 months in advance, which allows for the 
time and flexibility to change the acquisition strategy or cancel the 
procurement, if necessary.  This vetting at the SAE level gives 
senior management a chance to integrate larger organizational 
goals, which was a critical success factor found in leading 
organizations by the GAO (2005, p. 22). 
(2). Requirements Validation Process.  The AFPEO/CM mandates a 
requirements approval document (RAD) to certify the requirement 
before the acquisition process formally begins (R. Culpepper, 
personal communication, July 6, 2011).  The advanced 
procurement planning and the RAD approval ensure that the 
services are actually required and give the AFPEO/CM time to 
determine how to meet the requestor's needs more effectively. 
(3). Delegation Scheme.  The other best practice under the capital 
investment critical success factor is the AFPEO/CM’s delegation 
scheme.  The AFPEO/CM’s delegation scheme is a great example 
of the GAO’s principle of requiring management review and 
approval at different levels.  Each MAJCOM can earn approval 
authority for acquisitions up to the DoD review threshold ($2 billion) 
based on how well they manage their programs (AFPEO/CM, 
personal communication, July 15, 2011).  The delegation allows the 
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b. Employing Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approaches 
Similar to the capital investment strategy, the GAO (2005) based its 
evaluation of knowledge-based acquisition approaches on weapon systems 
research and development and product procurement (not on service 
acquisitions).  However, within the knowledge-based acquisition approach, one 
of the areas to look for in effective organizations was how the organization uses 
lessons learned (GAO, 2005).   
(1). Services Workshop.  We discovered through our interviews that 
one of the AFPEO/CM’s best practices is the services workshop.  
The AFPEO/CM office hosts the services workshop each year to 
disseminate new DoD policy, new Air Force policy, and lessons 
learned from recent large service acquisitions between contracting 
personnel and customers.  The workshop also has roundtable 
discussions with personnel from the field to allow for a cross-flow of 
ideas to improve services acquisitions (AFPEO/CM, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011) across the Air Force. 
D. Lessons Learned and Recommendations to the Army 
and Navy 
1. Lessons Learned 
The following is a list of lessons learned from the AFPEO/CM and its 
stakeholders, which we collected during our interviews.  We developed these 
lessons learned based on practices that were identified by the AFPEO/CM 
leadership and/or stakeholders as valuable when establishing a new office to 
oversee service acquisitions.  This list is a compilation of all the suggested 
lessons from the interviews: 
 DoD agencies should not rely on contracting personnel to perform 
as the services acquisition program managers.  (This is directly in 
line with recommendations from Apte and Rendon’s 2007 research 
entitled Managing the Service Supply Chain in the Department of 
Defense: Implications for the Program Management Infrastructure.) 
 Senior managers for the acquisition of services (as defined by 
USD[AT&L], 2010b) should get early buy-in from senior leaders on 
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 Senior managers for the acqusition of services should ensure that 
their offices are staffed adequately, specifically with cross-
functional experts including personnel from departments such as 
contracting, finance, program management, legal, and operations. 
 The SAE should embrace services acquisition as a core part of his 
or her responsibility, build a sense of ownership, and create policies 
to institutionalize lessons learned. 
 Senior managers for the acquisition of services should evaluate 
contract review processes and timelines to ensure that they are 
adding value and not too time consuming. 
 The SAE should be willing to assume and manage risk (not simply 
avoid it). 
 The SAE should create rules of engagement for field personnel and 
higher level reviewers when working with the senior manager for 
the acqusition of services office. 
 Senior managers for the acquisition of services should leverage 
new technologies when managing services acquisitions. 
 Senior managers for the acquisition of services should develop a 
plan and consider the time it takes for contractor transitions in a 
competitive environment for large follow-on acquisitions. 
 Senior managers for the acquisition of services should work closely 
with the Small Business Administration when considering large 
enterprise-wide contracts. 
 Senior managers for the acquisition of services should institute 
quarterly communication of lessons learned, hot-button items, and 
how to make acquisitions better by communicating this information 
in-person, in a newsletter, or through an online database. 
 Senior managers for the acquisition of services should create a 
repository of service acquisition best practices for MAJCOM and 
other customers. 
2. Recommendations From Interviews 
During our interviews, we specifically asked interviewees for 
recommendations from the AFPEO/CM and its stakeholders for the Army and 
Navy to use as they establish positions for senior managers for the acquisitions 
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 Gauge the size of the department’s mission and decide what levels 
are important for oversight.  The $100 million threshold may not be 
the best for every agency. 
 Develop strong communication strategies, to include inviting 
industry to see and hear how the PEO for services operates with 
industry and fits in as a part of the federal procurement process. 
 Get early top-level support with a written charter or agreement of 
expectations. 
 Be patient. 
 Staff the service manager’s office with a multi-functional team of 
experts. 
 Bridge the gap between the acquisition community and the 
functional communities within your agency through training with the 
help of the DAU. 
 Rotate personnel through and within the service manager’s office to 
spread lessons learned through the entire agency and to get 
broader training and experience for personnel. 
 Adequately fund the senior manager for services office to allow it to 
train agency customers during acqusitions.  
 Develop a robust data system to track acquisition schedules and 
key milestones. 
 Create a repository of best practices for customers to learn and pull 
from. 
 Institute strong post-award processes for monitoring and oversight 
(e.g., AERs and services program health assessments). 
 Create an incremental plan to implement the senior manager for 
services office; do not try to put it into operation overnight. 
3. Recommendations From This Research Project 
The following sections list the recommendations to the Army and Navy 
that we derived from the best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations 
suggested by interviewees from the AFPEO/CM; these recommedations express 
the top five practices that can assist the Army and Navy in successfully 
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recommendations do not include all best practices, lessons learned, or 
recommendations available.  We selected these recommendations based on the 
initial development stage in which they function and on the high number of critical 
success factors that each one fulfills from the GAO Framework. 
a. Recommendation 1 
Develop a delegation scheme that includes clear EMAs—similar to those 
used by the AFPEO/CM—that develop internal accountable oversight of services 
acquisitions to aid in partnering with internal organizations, empowering cross-
functional teams, monitoring and providing oversight to achieve desired 
outcomes, enabling financial accountability, and using sound capital investment 
strategies. 
b. Recommendation 2 
Develop a requirements validation process similar to the AFPEO/CM’s 
RAD that allows requirements to be vetted early to aid in assessing internal 
requirements and the impact of external events and in using sound capital 
investment strategies. 
c. Recommendation 3 
Conduct informal planning meetings similar to the AFPEO/CM’s ESIS to 
allow for open idea flow, communication, and reduction in rework that aids in 
assessing internal requirements and the impact of external events. 
d. Recommendation 4 
Develop a review and accountability process similar to the AFPEO/CM’s 
services program health briefings that gives an enterprise-wide snapshot of the 
condition of the services contract portfolio management of an organization to aid 
in partnering with internal organizations, empowering cross-functional teams, and 
enabling financial accountability. 
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Hold discussions for sharing lessons learned and best practices similar to 
the AFPEO/CM’s services workshop at least annually to aid in partnering with 
internal organizations, empowering cross-functional teams, and employing 
knowledge-based acquisition approaches.  We recommend, based on 
discussions with the AFPEO/CM customers, that this practice be enhanced by 
using consistently updated online tools such as a Wiki to enable the senior 
manager for services office and the field to share with other members in the field 
in real-time, rather than once every 12 to 18 months. 
E. Summary 
In this chapter we discussed the results of our study in terms of the 
primary research question: What are the best practices within the AFPEO/CM 
structure?  Furthermore, we addressed the secondary questions: What are the 
primary lessons learned from working with the AFPEO/CM, and what 
recommendations should the Army and the Navy incorporate in order to develop 
their senior manager position for service acquisition?  In this chapter we also 
presented the results of the interviews we conducted with previous and prior 
AFPEO/CM leaders, program managers, and key customers and stakeholders.  
In these interviews we asked questions that were designed to draw out areas 
indentified in Cornerstone 2 of the GAO Framework as best practices (identified 
as items to look for in the GAO report) and caution areas (identified as cautions 
in the GAO report).   
Furthermore, in this study we drew out lessons learned from the 
AFPEO/CM as well as recommendations for the Army and Navy as they 
establish their senior manager for the acquisition of services.  We discussed 
recommendations for the Army and Navy, as well as the AFPEO/CM, in the 
context of the aforementioned GAO Framework, Cornerstone 2.  In the next 
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VI. Summary, Conclusions, and Areas for 
Further Research 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter we provide a summary of our research, conclusions drawn 
from the study, and areas highlighted for further research.  The purpose of this 
study was to provide the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy with a benchmark 
study of lessons learned from the creation and operation of the AFPEO/CM.  The 
USD(AT&L) outlined in his Better Buying Power memorandum (2010b) to all 
secretaries of the military departments and directors of the defense agencies the 
need to improve tradecraft in service acquisition across the DoD.  This 
memorandum (USD[AT&L], 2010b) required the Army and the Navy to create a 
senior manager for the acquisition of services “following the Air Force’s example” 
(p. 11).  In this benchmark study we sought to use the GAO Framework to 
provide a list of best practices to Army and Navy acquisition leaders. In this 
report we provided the background and purpose of this benchmark study, the 
research questions developed, the methodology for answering these questions, a 
comprehensive literature review of the subject studied, a description of the 
agency studied, a discussion of how the information was collected, an analysis 
and interpretation of the results, conclusions from the results of the study, and, 
finally, areas for future research. 
B. Summary 
DoD contract management has been on the GAO’s high-risk list since 
1992.  In reviewing the acquisition of services, the GAO has found that the DoD 
exposes itself to “unnecessary risks” by being inefficient and ineffective (GAO, 
2007, p. 5).  As of FY2009, DoD service contracts exceeded product contracts 
57% to 43% in terms of dollar value (USD[AT&L], 2011).  This combination of 
high dollar value and high risk make efficient and effective service contract 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 74 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
Ashton Carter, established the need to adopt government practices that 
encourage efficiency.  Until recently, the AFPEO/CM was the only senior 
executive in the DoD’s military departments dedicated to the execution of 
contract services acquisition.  One of the primary practices identified by Dr. 
Carter was the need to manage service acquisition oversight and policy at more 
senior levels, in line with the AFPEO/CM model, for all of the DoD. 
In this study we assessed best practices of the AFPEO/CM by using 
Cornerstone 2 from the GAO Framework (2005).  The primary function of the 
Framework is to provide executive management with a means to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of high-level acquisition functions.  Based on 
Cornerstone 2, we developed a list of interview questions (Appendix A) to ask 
members of the Air Force acquisition and contracting communities.  We 
interviewed the current acting Program Executive Officer for Combat and Mission 
Support at the AFPEO/CM, Mr. Randall Culpepper, as well as some of his 
predecessors.  In addition, we interviewed four individuals in the AFPEO/CM as 
well as some of the primary customers of the AFPEO/CM. 
C. Conclusions 
We present the conclusions of this study in the context of the research 
questions we defined in Chapter I.  In this study we assessed the following 
primary research question: 
 What are the best practices within the AFPEO/CM structure? 
The best practices noted most often by the interviewed subjects and that 
most closely tied to the intent of Cornerstone 2 of the GAO Framework were the 
delegation schemes with EMAs, the requirements validation process, the ESIS, 
the service program health briefings, and, finally, the services workshops.  These 
practices aid in partnering with internal organizations, empowering cross-
functional teams, monitoring and providing oversight to achieve desired 
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enabling financial accountability, using sound capital investment strategies, and 
employing knowledge-based acquisition approaches. 
Table 4. AFPEO/CM Best Practices Summary  
GAO Best Practice from 
Cornerstone 2, Element 1: Planning 
Strategically 
AFPEO/CM Best Practices 
a. Partnering with Internal 
Organizations 
(1) Official Charter with SAE 
(2) Delegation Scheme 
(3) Services Program Health 
(4) Services Workshop 
b. Assessing Internal Requirements 
and the Impact of External Events 
(1) Advance Procurement Planning 
(2) Requirements Validation 
Process 
(3) External Political Factors  
 Anticipation 
(4) Early Strategies and Issues 
Session 
(5) Enterprise Vantage Point 
(6) Full-Time Market Intelligence 
 Expert 
GAO Best Practice from 
Cornerstone 2, Element 2: 
Effectively Managing the Acquisition 
Process 
AFPEO/CM Best Practices 
a. Empowering Cross-Functional 
Teams 
(1) Services Program Health 
(2) Delegation Scheme 
(3) Services Workshop 
b. Managing and Engaging Suppliers (1) AFPEO/CM  and Service 
 Advocates at MAJCOM Level 
(2) Industry Days 
(3) Identifying Key Vendors 
c. Monitoring and Providing Oversight 
to Achieve Desired Outcomes 
(1) Annual Execution Review  
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(3) Services Acquisition Air Force 
 Instruction 
d. Enabling Financial Accountability (1) Annual Execution Review  
(2) Delegation Scheme 
(3) Services Program Health 
GAO Best Practice from 
Cornerstone 2, Element 3: 
Promoting Successful Outcomes of 
Major Projects 
AFPEO/CM Best Practices 
a. Using Sound Capital Investment 
Strategies 
(1) Advance Procurement Planning 
(2) Requirements Validation 
Process 
(3) Delegation Scheme 
b. Employing Knowledge-Based 
Acquisition Approaches 
(1) Services Workshop 
We answered the following supplementary research questions in this 
study:  
 What are the primary lessons learned from working with the 
AFPEO/CM? 
As listed in Chapter V of this report, the primary lessons learned that came 
out of the interviews discussed agency buy-in, clarifying agency procedural rules 
of engagement, learning to manage risk versus avoiding it, increasing cross-
functional interaction, and developing better knowledge management systems for 
the future. 
 What recommendations should the Army and the Navy incorporate 
in order to develop their senior manager position for service 
acquisition? 
As listed in Chapter V, the primary recommendations to the Army and 
Navy included taking an incremental approach to standing up their senior 
manager for the acquisition of services offices, gauging the appropriate dollar 
thresholds for the office’s management oversight, collecting best practices early, 
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early top-level buy-in, utilize a robust data system early, and create a method for 
monitoring acquisitions after the contract is awarded (similar to the AERs and 
services program health briefings used by the AFPEO/CM). 
The results of our research show that the AFPEO/CM has multiple best 
practices that can aid the Army and Navy in the creation of processes and 
policies for their fledgling senior manager for the acquisition of services offices.  
The effectiveness of these best practices has been proven based on the direct 
link between them and the critical success factors listed in the GAO Framework.  
There is no set way to institute these best practices and one size does not fit all.  
The Army and Navy must measure themselves against similar criteria and 
develop their offices through an incremental approach. 
D. Areas for Further Research 
Several recommendations for further research came to light during this 
study.  We recommend that the AFPEO/CM do follow-on assessments of its best 
practices listed within this study as well as of any practices taken by the Army 
and Navy to measure their effectiveness in regard to Cornerstone 2 of the GAO 
Framework.  This study could be done internally, by outside consulting firms, or 
by NPS students. 
In this study we did not measure the AFPEO/CM against the GAO 
Framework’s Cornerstone 1, Organizational Alignment and Leaderships; 
Cornerstone 3, Human Capital; or Cornerstone 4, Knowledge and Information 
Management.  Further research into the AFPEO/CM using these areas of the 
Framework would be beneficial to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  All elements of 
Cornerstones 1–4 of the GAO Framework should be applied to the Army and 
Navy senior manager for services offices in the future. 
Finally, best practice studies using Cornerstones 1–4 of the GAO 
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within the Air Force, including but not limited to the Enterprise Sourcing Group, 
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Appendix A. Interview Questions 
Interview Questions (consistent with the GAO Framework Cornerstone 2, 
Policies and Processes): 
1.  How do you define AFPEO/CM? 
2.  What was your role in the AFPEO/CM structure? 
ELEMENT 1: PLANNING STRATEGICALLY 
3.  Who are AFPEO/CMs primary stakeholders? 
4.  How do you work with your stakeholders to ensure understanding 
and coordination? 
5.  Are your stakeholders receptive to working with you for their 
requirements? 
6.  How do you strategically assess service acquisition needs and 
develop approaches to leverage purchasing volume? 
7.  What is the process for reviewing acquisition plans? 
8.   How does your organization project new demands and policy 
changes? 
9.   What are your organization’s processes for dealing with 
unforeseen external events and emergencies? 
ELEMENT 2: EFFECTIVELY MANAGING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
10.  To what extent does AFPEO/CM use cross-functional teams? 
11.  How does communication flow in the cross-functional teams? 
(good/poorly) 
12.  Does AFPEO/CM encourage cross-functional teams; if so, how? 
13.  What is the AFPEO/CM process for identifying key vendors? 
14.  How does AFPEO/CM manage vendor relationships, 
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15.  How does AFPEO/CM monitor its service contracts? 
16.  What are the roles and responsibilities of those in AFPEO/CM who 
manage contract performance and oversight? 
17.  How does AFPEO/CM manage and record contract financial 
information data?  
ELEMENT 3: PROMOTING SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES OF MAJOR 
PROJECTS 
18.  What are the key metrics/benchmarks that AFPEO/CM uses to 
monitor its performance as an organization? 
19.  What are AFPEO/CM’s major acquisition concerns?  
20.  Do you treat these acquisitions differently than others within 
AFPEO/CM; if so, how? 
21.  What recommendations would you give to the Army and Navy 
regarding the implementation of their own PEO for services offices? 
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